farr40

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About farr40

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  • Birthday 10/27/1971

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  1. IF there was a mistake, the mistake was not reading the SI carefully, however, the act of turning off the AIS was not a mistake. Without being on board, we don't know for sure. There may not have been a mistake at all, just like the people who used to not turn on navigation lights until hours after sunset and they have changed course, etc. Those people made a conscious decision to violate the rules and decided to take the risk, knowing that a) it is unlikely a competitor would file a chicken shit protest about navigation lights and b) even if a protest is filed, they can defend by saying their batteries were low and their lights are very dim, etc. It is entirely possible that the Wild Oats situation is a modern extension of that mentality. The act of turning off the AIS was not a mistake. It was most likely a deliberate choice (someone could have fallen against it, etc, but very unlikely given the timing of it going off line). I have been in discussions with boats that don't want their AIS to transmit (if it is not required by the rules) but they still want to receive other's transmissions for the tactical advantage.
  2. Hit it on the head. Richard's quote that "it" was not mandatory and his quick excuse that "it didn't matter because we could see each other the whole race" suggests an intentional choice they made to go stealth, knowing all the information AIS provides which visual confirmation does not. If its wasn't mandatory, nothing wrong with doing it, but it was and Richards either didin't read the SI's or worse, knowingly turned it off. Its a low class move similar to (in the days before trackers and AIS) boats that didn't turn on their nav lights until hours after sunset so that nearby competitors would lose visual id. Glen is correct, chicken shit by the R/C, but WO should be chucked none the less.
  3. farr40

    Chicago-Mac/Meridian X MOB Recovery

    I was on a boat which was nearby when the MOB occurred. We took part in attempting to locate the MOB. Here are a few observations from an involved 3rd party: I did not have the chance to speak to any of the Meridean crew on the island so I can't comment on what exactly occurred on their boat, but I assume they did hit the MOB button on their GPS because they repeatedly broadcast the exact lat / lon coordinates of where the MOB occurred over the radio while they were requesting assistance. Their radio operator did a great job remaining calm was very clear and concise which made attempting to render assistance much easier. He stayed on the radio with a new broadcast every few minutes updating as to that they had not recovered him, he was wearing a lifejacket, etc.. CH 16 was very chaotic because the tri which went over happened within a few moments of Meridean's broadcast. A number of boats attempted to render assistance to the tri and were all transmitting on 16 at the same time. The USCG was also on the radio attempting to sort out and respond to the two issues. Some of the broadcasts from Meridian were not being received by the USCG and had to be relayed by other boats, As for why no quick stop - a quick stop in those conditions, even a well executed one with a top crew, would probably have caused bigger problems and potentially have thrown others into the water as well. The boat would absolutely have rounded up during the maneuver. Even if crew was tethered, the boat may very well have been dragging two crew members along the side with a big A kite flogging uncontrollably all while trying to turn the boat around and spot a MOB.