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Dive Boat Conception deaths - more details


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2 hours ago, Tacoma Mud Flats said:

The original MAX design has two flight control systems (typical for 1960s requirements) but only one is active in flight (they don't compare against each other, the other is not active.  They alternate being the sole flight control computer between flights, so if one of them has a problem it is discovered at least every other flight.  The redundancy chain is flight control computer (singular), then manual piloting. 

Was it cheaper for Boeing to carry over this 1960s design because they can?  Ask a Boeing stock holder.

The reason for the ongoing life of the 737 is that it is very expensive to (a) do a clean sheet of paper aircraft design (b) build all new jigs, fixtures etc and learn how to do efficient production (c) re-train pilots on a new type of aircraft. By not changing the design you can certify the pilots at minimal cost. This keeps airlines (customers) happy.

A 737 flight control system is nothing like an Airbus fly-by-wire.  From my reading it has dual redundant hydraulic systems. But you don't have a computer interpreting your control inputs as on an Airbus and then the computer deciding what to actuate. It even has mechanical controls (wire/pulleys) as backups if the hydraulics fail. 

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On 1/4/2022 at 3:33 PM, Zonker said:

The reason for the ongoing life of the 737 is that it is very expensive to (a) do a clean sheet of paper aircraft design (b) build all new jigs, fixtures etc and learn how to do efficient production (c) re-train pilots on a new type of aircraft. By not changing the design you can certify the pilots at minimal cost. This keeps airlines (customers) happy.

A 737 flight control system is nothing like an Airbus fly-by-wire.  From my reading it has dual redundant hydraulic systems. But you don't have a computer interpreting your control inputs as on an Airbus and then the computer deciding what to actuate. It even has mechanical controls (wire/pulleys) as backups if the hydraulics fail. 

The crashes were all about a single sensor not the flight control computer.
How the FAA let the plane get certified with a single sensor in charge defies belief
( mid you if the pilots were trained they only had to turn the autopilot on and all those people would be alive)

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7 hours ago, Sailabout said:

The crashes were all about a single sensor not the flight control computer.
How the FAA let the plane get certified with a single sensor in charge defies belief
( mid you if the pilots were trained they only had to turn the autopilot on and all those people would be alive)

I think it was Juan Brown who pointed out that U.S. pilots in particular are not likely to have crashed--because they are almost all former military pilots with extensive training and time. On the other hand much of the world's pilots are not, and they are simply not prepared to stick and rudder an airliner. I may be oversimplifying. However I do remember though cannot seem to find now the statements from early on from a couple American pilots mentioning just knocking off the autopilot and trim when it went wonky on the new plane. Need to find that.

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5 minutes ago, fastyacht said:
7 hours ago, Sailabout said:

The crashes were all about a single sensor not the flight control computer.
How the FAA let the plane get certified with a single sensor in charge defies belief
( mid you if the pilots were trained they only had to turn the autopilot on and all those people would be alive)

I think it was Juan Brown who pointed out that U.S. pilots in particular are not likely to have crashed--because they are almost all former military pilots with extensive training and time. On the other hand much of the world's pilots are not, and they are simply not prepared to stick and rudder an airliner. I may be oversimplifying. However I do remember though cannot seem to find now the statements from early on from a couple American pilots mentioning just knocking off the autopilot and trim when it went wonky on the new plane. Need to find that.

The common narrative among pilots (ones without direct experience either with the problem or the investigation) is that the problem was pilots stalling, fighting the anti-stall mechanism.

The real problem, which Sailabout does correctly identify above, is that the anti-stall system depended on a single air flow sensor which was prone to trouble... it was an expensive option to add another air flow sensor which apparently made the system much better... and the system dove the plane HARD into the ground.

And the control layout and software made it difficult/impossible to turn off quickly.

- DSK

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1 hour ago, Steam Flyer said:

The common narrative among pilots (ones without direct experience either with the problem or the investigation) is that the problem was pilots stalling, fighting the anti-stall mechanism.

The real problem, which Sailabout does correctly identify above, is that the anti-stall system depended on a single air flow sensor which was prone to trouble... it was an expensive option to add another air flow sensor which apparently made the system much better... and the system dove the plane HARD into the ground.

And the control layout and software made it difficult/impossible to turn off quickly.

- DSK

DSK, close, in that pilots were fighting the anti-stall system.  But that system used the normal aircraft trim system.  Had they treated the problem as if it were a “runaway” trim problem (which it was, just not as a result of them using the trim) and used the trim disconnect paddle on the yoke, then they would have disengaged the electric trim that MCAS was using to try to prevent a (non-existent) stall.

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"...A 737 flight control system is nothing like an Airbus fly-by-wire.  From my reading it has dual redundant hydraulic systems. But you don't have a computer interpreting your control inputs as on an Airbus and then the computer deciding what to actuate. It even has mechanical controls (wire/pulleys) as backups if the hydraulics fail..."

The most expensive part of a commercial transport aircraft are the sheets of paper that certify it.  Once certified, any changes are expensive and results in a cost vs. benefit analysis for every considered change/update.

Unfortunately, the benefits of increased safety vs. increased profitable sales are not equal.  Guess which one is selected in the board room.  Safety ultimately takes a back seat because due to grandfathering/evolution update, it can be argued that the design "meets all applicable safety standards".  What they don't say is that because of grandfathering/evolution update  these standards are from 1950, 1960, or 1970 and that no new, clean sheet of paper aircraft design would even be considered to allow to fly under those standards.  

This is the danger of grandfathering or allowing "evolution updates" of existing designs.  

The airline world has been down the road of the 737's hydraulic system's issues before:

(summarized by Wikipedia)

During the 1990s, a series of issues affecting the rudder of Boeing 737 passenger aircraft (-200 and Classic series) resulted in multiple fatal incidents. In two separate accidents, pilots lost control of their aircraft due to a sudden and unexpected rudder movement, and the resulting crashes killed everyone on board, 157 people in total.  Similar rudder issues led to a temporary loss of control on at least one other Boeing 737 flight before the problem was ultimately identified. (At least five other crashes/incidents, some with loss of life are also suspected).

Unlike other twin-engine large transport aircraft in service at the time, the Boeing 737 was designed with a single rudder panel and single rudder actuator. The single rudder panel is controlled by a single hydraulic Power Control Unit (PCU).  Inside the PCU is a dual servo valve that, based on input from the pilot's rudder pedals or the aircraft's yaw damper system, directs the flow of hydraulic fluid in order to move the rudder.  The PCU for affected Boeing 737 aircraft was designed by Boeing and manufactured by Parker Hannifin.

The NTSB and Boeing engineers conducted a series of tests on the PCUs from Flight 517 and Flight 427, as well as PCUs used in other aircraft and a brand-new PCU that had not yet been used in flight (the PCU from Flight 585, although it had been recovered, was too badly damaged to test in this manner). Testing revealed that under certain circumstances, the PCU's dual servo valve could jam and deflect the rudder in the opposite direction of the pilots' intended input. [push right, goes unexpectedly left] Thermal shock testing revealed that the uncommanded rudder movement could be replicated by injecting a cold PCU with hot hydraulic fluid. Thermal shock resulted in the servo's secondary slide becoming jammed against the servo housing, and that when the secondary slide was jammed the primary slide could move to a position that resulted in rudder movement opposite of the pilot's commands. The NTSB concluded that all three rudder incidents (United Flight 585, USAir Flight 427, and Eastwind Flight 517) were most likely due to the PCU secondary slide jamming and excessive travel of the primary slide, resulting in the rudder reversal. 

On March 24, 1999, after a four-year investigation, the NTSB issued its probable cause finding for Flight 427. The NTSB concluded that the probable cause of the Flight 427 crash was rudder reversal due to the PCU servo malfunction. Two years later, the NTSB published an amended accident report for Flight 585 that found the same probable cause for that accident as well.

As a result of the NTSB's findings, the Federal Aviation Administration ordered that the servo valves be replaced on all 737s by November 12, 2002.  The FAA also ordered new training protocols for pilots to handle in an unexpected movement of flight controls.

As for (mechanical) cable control vs. fly-by-wire, in large commercial transport aircraft, earlier generation large commercial transport aircraft that use control cables are cables pulling on hydraulic valves controlling hydraulic rams or screw jacks, not actual flight control surfaces.  The amount of force required can only be achieved by a mechanical-force multiplier. The hydraulic system has several backup power sources (RAT, free-wheel engine, electric piump).  On a large commercial transport aircraft, hydraulic fluid pressure is lost, pilots can pull on the cables all day with no effect (United DC-10 Sioux City crash).

Because of its 1960s design origins (it is a reduced featured 707/727 architecture) and its smaller size, the 737 has legacy "manual reversion" or direct mechanical connection to some flight control surfaces.  But importantly, not the tail.  Not sure how one will land without tail control.  (There have been 737 "dead stick" landings, but under partial hydraulic control).

Which is better (fly-by-wire or hydraulic by cable) on the aircraft I'm flying on? -- Any control system (mechanical or electronic) that provides the maximum amount of redundancy and meets the most current safety requirements.   Today, that's likely a fly-by-wire system.  Just like the CAN-based fly-by-wire system controlling the throttle in most modern SUVs or steer-by-wire system in Nissan/Legacy/Teslas.  

 

 

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5 hours ago, Boathavn said:

 

"...A 737 flight control system is nothing like an Airbus fly-by-wire.  From my reading it has dual redundant hydraulic systems. But you don't have a computer interpreting your control inputs as on an Airbus and then the computer deciding what to actuate. It even has mechanical controls (wire/pulleys) as backups if the hydraulics fail..."

The most expensive part of a commercial transport aircraft are the sheets of paper that certify it.  Once certified, any changes are expensive and results in a cost vs. benefit analysis for every considered change/update.

Unfortunately, the benefits of increased safety vs. increased profitable sales are not equal.  Guess which one is selected in the board room.  Safety ultimately takes a back seat because due to grandfathering/evolution update, it can be argued that the design "meets all applicable safety standards".  What they don't say is that because of grandfathering/evolution update  these standards are from 1950, 1960, or 1970 and that no new, clean sheet of paper aircraft design would even be considered to allow to fly under those standards.  

This is the danger of grandfathering or allowing "evolution updates" of existing designs.  

The airline world has been down the road of the 737's hydraulic system's issues before:

(summarized by Wikipedia)

During the 1990s, a series of issues affecting the rudder of Boeing 737 passenger aircraft (-200 and Classic series) resulted in multiple fatal incidents. In two separate accidents, pilots lost control of their aircraft due to a sudden and unexpected rudder movement, and the resulting crashes killed everyone on board, 157 people in total.  Similar rudder issues led to a temporary loss of control on at least one other Boeing 737 flight before the problem was ultimately identified. (At least five other crashes/incidents, some with loss of life are also suspected).

Unlike other twin-engine large transport aircraft in service at the time, the Boeing 737 was designed with a single rudder panel and single rudder actuator. The single rudder panel is controlled by a single hydraulic Power Control Unit (PCU).  Inside the PCU is a dual servo valve that, based on input from the pilot's rudder pedals or the aircraft's yaw damper system, directs the flow of hydraulic fluid in order to move the rudder.  The PCU for affected Boeing 737 aircraft was designed by Boeing and manufactured by Parker Hannifin.

The NTSB and Boeing engineers conducted a series of tests on the PCUs from Flight 517 and Flight 427, as well as PCUs used in other aircraft and a brand-new PCU that had not yet been used in flight (the PCU from Flight 585, although it had been recovered, was too badly damaged to test in this manner). Testing revealed that under certain circumstances, the PCU's dual servo valve could jam and deflect the rudder in the opposite direction of the pilots' intended input. [push right, goes unexpectedly left] Thermal shock testing revealed that the uncommanded rudder movement could be replicated by injecting a cold PCU with hot hydraulic fluid. Thermal shock resulted in the servo's secondary slide becoming jammed against the servo housing, and that when the secondary slide was jammed the primary slide could move to a position that resulted in rudder movement opposite of the pilot's commands. The NTSB concluded that all three rudder incidents (United Flight 585, USAir Flight 427, and Eastwind Flight 517) were most likely due to the PCU secondary slide jamming and excessive travel of the primary slide, resulting in the rudder reversal. 

On March 24, 1999, after a four-year investigation, the NTSB issued its probable cause finding for Flight 427. The NTSB concluded that the probable cause of the Flight 427 crash was rudder reversal due to the PCU servo malfunction. Two years later, the NTSB published an amended accident report for Flight 585 that found the same probable cause for that accident as well.

As a result of the NTSB's findings, the Federal Aviation Administration ordered that the servo valves be replaced on all 737s by November 12, 2002.  The FAA also ordered new training protocols for pilots to handle in an unexpected movement of flight controls.

As for (mechanical) cable control vs. fly-by-wire, in large commercial transport aircraft, earlier generation large commercial transport aircraft that use control cables are cables pulling on hydraulic valves controlling hydraulic rams or screw jacks, not actual flight control surfaces.  The amount of force required can only be achieved by a mechanical-force multiplier. The hydraulic system has several backup power sources (RAT, free-wheel engine, electric piump).  On a large commercial transport aircraft, hydraulic fluid pressure is lost, pilots can pull on the cables all day with no effect (United DC-10 Sioux City crash).

Because of its 1960s design origins (it is a reduced featured 707/727 architecture) and its smaller size, the 737 has legacy "manual reversion" or direct mechanical connection to some flight control surfaces.  But importantly, not the tail.  Not sure how one will land without tail control.  (There have been 737 "dead stick" landings, but under partial hydraulic control).

Which is better (fly-by-wire or hydraulic by cable) on the aircraft I'm flying on? -- Any control system (mechanical or electronic) that provides the maximum amount of redundancy and meets the most current safety requirements.   Today, that's likely a fly-by-wire system.  Just like the CAN-based fly-by-wire system controlling the throttle in most modern SUVs or steer-by-wire system in Nissan/Legacy/Teslas.  

 

 

Lets not confuse fly by wire as in any assisted system with an Airbus and many fighters where stick input only goes to a computer that decides what happens.

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7 hours ago, fastyacht said:

I think it was Juan Brown who pointed out that U.S. pilots in particular are not likely to have crashed--because they are almost all former military pilots with extensive training and time. On the other hand much of the world's pilots are not, and they are simply not prepared to stick and rudder an airliner. I may be oversimplifying. However I do remember though cannot seem to find now the statements from early on from a couple American pilots mentioning just knocking off the autopilot and trim when it went wonky on the new plane. Need to find that.

perhaps US pilots  just had the training that says MCAS can crash this and the get out of jail card is turn on the autopilot which disconnects it?
In Boeings budget based sales program, they also didnt want to upgrade any sims so a conversion to a new 737 with mcas couldnt be learnt in the sim less some in the USA, certainly none in Asia.
They gave the pilots a tablet with a few instructions and said read this.


Turning on the autopilot is counter to what a pilot would normally do when you have a flight control issue.
Both those crashes the unskilled pilots let the aircraft go into overspeed so they then couldnt turn on the autopilot.

Even scarier, my buddy that is a 737 instructor said half of the pilots he gets in the simulator are not even aware their new 737 has mcas, yes dodgy asian/african airlines...

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2 minutes ago, fastyacht said:

Icthink i am confised.

Whayly I remember was the us pilots dosengagimgvthe trim rhing....whencthecwheels are spinni g ypu hit bitton

no the mcas has total control thats whats scary about it.
My buddy said if it went wrong in the death zone, like 100-200' agl it created an unrecoverable crash as you cant get the autopilot on in that situation and no time to trim it out.

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MCAS was giving false stall warnings. The first thing they teach you in ANY pilot training is not to pull up, keep the wings flying.

The pilots did the “right” thing and tried to keep airspeed up while they troubleshot/faught the MCAS (that they didn’t even know existed).  Yes they ended up overspeeding, but every pilot would in the same circumstances.

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20 minutes ago, Controversial_posts said:

MCAS was giving false stall warnings. The first thing they teach you in ANY pilot training is not to pull up, keep the wings flying.

The pilots did the “right” thing and tried to keep airspeed up while they troubleshot/faught the MCAS (that they didn’t even know existed).  Yes they ended up overspeeding, but every pilot would in the same circumstances.

the MCAS has control, it can drop the nose, you are not fighting a warning you are fighting control

If you leveled off you could put the autopilot on, granted not something you would normally do but you would in an MCAS equipped aircraft.

 

The reason it was added as when the engines got bigger and had to move forward and you did a pull up and bank on takeoff you would fall out of the sky, yes rare but anyway the mcas plane would stall so they added a control system to drop the nose, it had full control as it had to.
Problem was it was one aoa sensor.
if you are not in takoff climb it doesnt need to work hence the autopilot would turn it off.

Budget airlines do budget training right...

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35 minutes ago, Sailabout said:

Budget airlines do budget training right...

Budget aircraft manufacturer didn’t even fucking tell the airlines they had added a murder box that would decide to kill you if you didn’t guess the exact right sequence of otherwise irrational steps, before you hit the ground.

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1 hour ago, Controversial_posts said:

Budget aircraft manufacturer didn’t even fucking tell the airlines they had added a murder box that would decide to kill you if you didn’t guess the exact right sequence of otherwise irrational steps, before you hit the ground.

And the additional sensor that made the system actually work reliably was an optional extra.

- DSK

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1 hour ago, Steam Flyer said:

And the additional sensor that made the system actually work reliably was an optional extra.

- DSK

Except that even if you paid for the extra sensor, it still didn’t fix MCAS, because MCAS would only take  data from one of them! 
 

All the extra sensor did was let the pilot know your air data was wrong, as you struggled to keep MCAS from driving the plane i to the ground.

You can’t make this up, its so dumb.

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16 minutes ago, Controversial_posts said:
1 hour ago, Steam Flyer said:

And the additional sensor that made the system actually work reliably was an optional extra.

Except that even if you paid for the extra sensor, it still didn’t fix MCAS, because MCAS would only take  data from one of them! 
 

All the extra sensor did was let the pilot know your air data was wrong, as you struggled to keep MCAS from driving the plane i to the ground.

You can’t make this up, its so dumb.

Hmm, that's not the way it was explained in the material I've seen, but I may have misunderstood it. The extra sensor cost a hell of a lot of money and supposedly "eliminated this extremely unlikely failure mode" (approximate wording) by comparing the two.

Either way, it was dumb. Good sensors are cheap. Really great sensors, like mil-spec ones, are not that much more expensive. You do have to put them in the right place and connect them properly, though. Just an miserable failure on Boeing's part.

- DSK

 

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But it really does all come back to the grandfathering. That was what I couldn't help keying on right from the start--"oh my god--it is the same thing as marine design--find a way to be grandfathered, or read a loophole in the rules and you are in."  Make the boat measure 99.9 tons and put the overnight capacity below 49. If you don't build it with tonnage frames, what is the volume? Etc. (Interestingly because the Conception had belowdecks accommodations, she did not benefit nearly as much from these shenanigans as a daytime only ferry. Ive designed subchapter K (under 100 ton) ferries that held 400 passengers on 120 foot lengths. And rated 100 tons.

"Hey, it isn't a 737, you know it and I know it, but the FAA doesn't know it." "Yes, the plane will fly fine. But we have to make the plane pretend to fly like a 737 because then our customers don't have to retrain a bunch of pilots to fly it."

Etc.

Much of it isn't actually surprising. And there is a certain reasonableness about it--but at the same time, not reasonable. Ironically, there have been a number of high profile band new planes in the past 2 decades--A380, 777, 787....they couldn't grandfather them.

 

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There's a lot of sorta-correct, but not really correct info flowing about here.  So let's see if we can get it straightened out some.

1.  Boeing made a bunch of small mistakes (and some bigger ones) that snowballed and killed folks.  That is not acceptable, and is inexcusable.

2.  Boeing builds plenty of airplanes with triple redundant fly-by-wire flight control systems.  The B-777 series and the B-787 series, as well as the F/A-18 series of aircraft all have fly-by-wire controls.

3.  Fly-by-wire is not necessarily any safer than dual hydraulic flight control systems.  Both the Air France Flt 447's crash mid-atlantic  and the American Airlines Flt 587 A-300 crash on takeoff out of JFK are examples of Fly-by-wire allowing flight control inputs that lead to the loss of both aircraft.

***All Airliner Manufacturers are in business to make money.  Both Airbus and Boeing have designed, built and modified aircraft over the years to MAKE MONEY.  Wanting to make money doesn't make you a bad person.  Allowing a compromised design that could put people at risk into service with airlines whose pilots might not be that well trained makes you a bad person.

4. MCAS was designed to allow the 737 Max to have the same flight characteristics as an early 737 NG series aircraft.  That. in an of itself, is neither a good, nor a bad thing.  NASA implemented a similar computer controlled flight control augmentation system on its Shuttle Training System (Gulfstream 5s)  to allow them to simulate the flight characteristics of the Space Shuttle.

5.  All Boeing 737 Max's came with 2 independent AOA sensors.  The problem stemmed from needing an abnormal reading from 1 sensor only, and a poorly designed system to tell pilots there was a mis-match from the 2 AOA sensors.  One of the MCAS "fixes" is to require both AOA sensors to agree before triggering an MCAS intervention.

6. MCAS only works when the flaps are up, so it has no input in the 100-200 "death zone" as one poster put it, because you normally have your flaps down when taking off and landing.

7.  MCAS uses the elevator trim system to "push the nose down" by commanding nose down trim.  The 737 Max, like all 737s, still have a manual elevator trim wheel that is quite large, that allows you to manually trim the airplane in the event of a runaway trim disconnect.  When you trim the elevator either electrically or if MCAS commands nose down trim, that manual trim wheel starts spinning (and making a loud clacking noise).  IF THAT MANUAL TRIM WHEEL is spinning/clacking and you are not commanding a trim movement with the electric trim controller, then that should be a big clue that you have a big issue that is either runaway trim or an MCAS intervention.  This was the big warning sign those less-than-well trained pilots with less-than-great air sense missed.

8.  As the 2 737 Max crashes illustrate, there is a huge difference in pilot training and pilot proficiency/air-sense between airlines of say the US, Britian, France, Austrailia, etc, and the airlines of emerging third world.  Do your homework.  Check their safety records.  Then decide whose airplanes you will fly on.  Pilot quality has a huge impact on safety, much greater than are you flying an Airbus or a Boeing.

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9 hours ago, fastyacht said:

Well now both "budget" builders have black eyes--ironically for one similar aspect--sensor inputs causing catastrophe--in the Airbus case, the Air France mid-Atlantic

that was like a boeing and  pilots without enough skills crashed it.

AF changed lots after that

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8 hours ago, fastyacht said:

Hey, it isn't a 737, you know it and I know it, but the FAA doesn't know it." "Yes, the plane will fly fine. But we have to make the plane pretend to fly like a 737 because then our customers don't have to retrain a bunch of pilots to fly it."

Exactly, boeing built a plane the carriers wanted not the other way around.

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7 hours ago, Crash said:

MCAS only works when the flaps are up, so it has no input in the 100-200 "death zone" as one poster put it, because you normally have your flaps down when taking off and landing.

if mcas doesnt work on take off climb what use is it hence why add it to the max?
When are you exceeding the old accepted aoa during normal flight?

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7 hours ago, Crash said:

Boeing builds plenty of airplanes with triple redundant fly-by-wire flight control systems.  The B-777 series and the B-787 series, as well as the F/A-18 series of aircraft all have fly-by-wire controls.

fly by wire or computer controlled flying surfaces, thats 2 vastly different things, boeing went down one route, airbus the other.
How do you describe the famous 737 rudder actuator, no wire cables, no computer, no electronics, like most Boeings...

yes the F18 like most fighters require a computer solution to control flight surfaces.

The MAX showed a computer deciding whats right is not smart when one sensor is feeding you the data so they changed that and prevented the computer from making decisions

https://www.boeing.com/737-max-updates/mcas/

MCAS will never override the pilot’s ability to control the airplane using the control column alone.

PS when does the pilot have control..takeoff and landing.

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We have strayed a wee bit from dive boats, but all human safety starts with common sense.  When I wrote software, I had to spend almost as many hours testing as I did writing the code.  Still I would find errors when the program went into the wild.  However, what I really learned was seeing the errors others made.  Specifically not giving the user a choice outside of the choices the programmer included in his software.  Absolutely The Worst, let me repeat Absolutely THE WORST applications were written by folks who NEVER worked in the field they were writing applications for. 

Going back a couple of sentences.  My input boxes either included an automatic choice (such as today’s date) or a number of choices (a, b. c. Etc but the last choice was always an empty box where the end user could input a choice that was not automatically included or the ability to cancel the automatic choice and input the choice the user needed. .  

Aircraft, of all man’s mechanical devices, Never, Ever should include any software assisting the pilot, that is not easily defeated.  In old style cockpits there were six primary instruments.  When things did not look right, always, at least one told the truth.  That’s what we were taught.  That’s also why we were taught unusual attitudes.  We used our head to see what did not look right and what did.  Then we went with the correct choice.  Obviously, I made enough correct choices.  So, it is the pilot who is responsible not the computer, he/she needs to have the final say.  Now airplanes do a pretty good job of flying themselves (modern fighters and flying wings excluded) However, Software developers often get lost in their own coding.  Its easy to do.  But the results can be deadly.  

The men responsible for packing parachutes have to be airborne rated their own selves.  They have to jump with random picked parachutes they have actually packed.  maybe coders for aircraft software should also be rated for the aircraft they are writing code for.  Nothing like testing your own stuff. (To make sure it’s DAMNED Right!) 

Why did I learn to code.  Being dyslexic and having to work with number systems that went out to the fifth and sixth decimal, it took too long to do the calculations three times trying to get two to agree.  My apps which were full standalone computer programs, made those long afternoon jobs a ten minute breeze.  

After I began to code and got some pretty good apps out in the wild, they were so easy to use the paras started using them and I worked myself out of a job. :D

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Well the very encouraging thing about the latest news on the Dive Boat issue is that in fact the recommendations seem to capture the glaring issues I saw--namely at the top of them, two ways out that are actually 2 ways out--not going to the same place--and an alarm system that actually works. What does not seem to be included is making sure that you have a way to fight your way out of a confined space--in other words the fire main is not required to be belowdecks as well. I will follow up on this and see if I missed something. The recommendations regarding chargers etc also very important. what sorts of things are plugged in certainly has evolved.

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On 5/23/2020 at 5:16 PM, Zonker said:

https://www.military.com/daily-news/2020/05/22/autopsies-34-who-died-conception-boat-fire-offer-grim-new-details.html

"Of the 33 passengers and one deckhand below deck, at least six were wearing shoes, boots or some kind of footwear when their bodies were discovered, according to the coroner's records.

One man was clutching a cellphone in his right hand. A woman was holding a blue flashlight and wearing brown slip-on shoes, according to a coroner's report. 

The man with his silver cellphone was wearing denim pants with a black belt. According to the coroner's records, he was wearing an unusual combination of footwear, one black sandal and one brown-black hiking boot for a left foot."

So in other words - some of them awoke, started to get dressed and couldn't get out...

Did anyone capture what that link went to? IT went dead.

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I saw a quote in one story about the whole 737 max debacle where a frustrated pilot said "we want planes that any pilot can fly, not planes that only a super-hero pilot can fly" or something like that. It is very clear that the overall system on the 737 max was unacceptable, even if extremely professional pilots who read up on MCAS and how it works (something that was not required by statute or regulation) would have a pretty good chance of keeping the plane in the air.

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On 1/8/2022 at 9:45 PM, Crash said:

 

8.  As the 2 737 Max crashes illustrate, there is a huge difference in pilot training and pilot proficiency/air-sense between airlines of say the US, Britian, France, Austrailia, etc, and the airlines of emerging third world.  Do your homework.  Check their safety records.  Then decide whose airplanes you will fly on.  Pilot quality has a huge impact on safety, much greater than are you flying an Airbus or a Boeing.

During the 70s, 80s, and into the 90s, I travelled internationally very often, usually several times each month. I stopped flying on secondary carriers after three consecutive flights on China Airlines with missed approaches in fair weather conditions. In fact, these were the first, last, and only three times I flew on China Airlines.

There is certainly a HUGE difference between airlines where the entire staff involved in flying (air crews, schedulers, and especially maintenance) speak, read, and understand english well, and those that don't. The primary European carriers are very good, as English proficiency is pervasive.

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25 minutes ago, carcrash said:

There is certainly a HUGE difference between airlines where the entire staff involved in flying (air crews, schedulers, and especially maintenance) speak, read, and understand english well, and those that don't.

Or give a shit about the ruIes, I once flew Aeroflot and there were goats on the plane and mid flight a couple fired up a hand pump camp/cookstove, but how much can you expect from folks that drink as much Vodka as I drink water!

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3 hours ago, oldsurfer said:

Or give a shit about the ruIes, I once flew Aeroflot and there were goats on the plane and mid flight a couple fired up a hand pump camp/cookstove, but how much can you expect from folks that drink as much Vodka as I drink water!

I heard that tall tale before.

 

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Boeing contract the sim work out to 3rd parties so they can influence behind the scene when they need that pilot that cant fly but his cousin is starting a budget airline..Airbus has much higher standards in this regard.

My buddy had a Korean ( where else) ex military, had a relative about to buy 737's, he was unable to do a single engine take off, landing or go around. Boeing forced the contractor to keep changing the instructor till somebody passed him.
There are plenty more stories where that one came from.
 

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4 hours ago, carcrash said:

During the 70s, 80s, and into the 90s, I travelled internationally very often, usually several times each month. I stopped flying on secondary carriers after three consecutive flights on China Airlines with missed approaches in fair weather conditions. In fact, these were the first, last, and only three times I flew on China Airlines.

There is certainly a HUGE difference between airlines where the entire staff involved in flying (air crews, schedulers, and especially maintenance) speak, read, and understand english well, and those that don't. The primary European carriers are very good, as English proficiency is pervasive.

Both my instructor buddys tell me many asian airlines a young FO comes with the old guy and his job is to read the manual when something comes up on the screen as the young ones can read English.

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22 minutes ago, Sailabout said:

Boeing contract the sim work out to 3rd parties so they can influence behind the scene when they need that pilot that cant fly but his cousin is starting a budget airline..Airbus has much higher standards in this regard.

My buddy had a Korean ( where else) ex military, had a relative about to buy 737's, he was unable to do a single engine take off, landing or go around. Boeing forced the contractor to keep changing the instructor till somebody passed him.
There are plenty more stories where that one came from.
 

Ok, we get it!  You think Boeing is the devil, and Airbus a saint…

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7 minutes ago, Crash said:

Ok, we get it!  You think Boeing is the devil, and Airbus a saint…

no just re laying the facts in Asia, both brands crash here.

oops missed the runway

 

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3 hours ago, fastyacht said:
6 hours ago, oldsurfer said:

Or give a shit about the ruIes, I once flew Aeroflot and there were goats on the plane and mid flight a couple fired up a hand pump camp/cookstove, but how much can you expect from folks that drink as much Vodka as I drink water!

I heard that tall tale before.

I have not personally witnessed people on a 3rd world airliner buidling a fire to cook dinner/lunch/whatever, but I have been aboard a plane with livestock a couple of times. Usually just chickens, but I made the acquaintance one time of what looked and smelled and acted much like very small cow. Friendly critter. When Mrs Steam and I visited Indonesia we couldn't decide which was worse, the buses or the planes (which were quite cheap). I advocated to take the planes because if something went wrong, it would be over quickly.

So many people have told me about cook fires on planes in similar circumstances that it's very tempting to believe it.

- DSK

 

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On 1/9/2022 at 12:45 AM, Crash said:

There's a lot of sorta-correct, but not really correct info flowing about here.  So let's see if we can get it straightened out some.

1.  Boeing made a bunch of small mistakes (and some bigger ones) that snowballed and killed folks.  That is not acceptable, and is inexcusable.

2.  Boeing builds plenty of airplanes with triple redundant fly-by-wire flight control systems.  The B-777 series and the B-787 series, as well as the F/A-18 series of aircraft all have fly-by-wire controls.

3.  Fly-by-wire is not necessarily any safer than dual hydraulic flight control systems.  Both the Air France Flt 447's crash mid-atlantic  and the American Airlines Flt 587 A-300 crash on takeoff out of JFK are examples of Fly-by-wire allowing flight control inputs that lead to the loss of both aircraft.

***All Airliner Manufacturers are in business to make money.  Both Airbus and Boeing have designed, built and modified aircraft over the years to MAKE MONEY.  Wanting to make money doesn't make you a bad person.  Allowing a compromised design that could put people at risk into service with airlines whose pilots might not be that well trained makes you a bad person.

4. MCAS was designed to allow the 737 Max to have the same flight characteristics as an early 737 NG series aircraft.  That. in an of itself, is neither a good, nor a bad thing.  NASA implemented a similar computer controlled flight control augmentation system on its Shuttle Training System (Gulfstream 5s)  to allow them to simulate the flight characteristics of the Space Shuttle.

5.  All Boeing 737 Max's came with 2 independent AOA sensors.  The problem stemmed from needing an abnormal reading from 1 sensor only, and a poorly designed system to tell pilots there was a mis-match from the 2 AOA sensors.  One of the MCAS "fixes" is to require both AOA sensors to agree before triggering an MCAS intervention.

6. MCAS only works when the flaps are up, so it has no input in the 100-200 "death zone" as one poster put it, because you normally have your flaps down when taking off and landing.

7.  MCAS uses the elevator trim system to "push the nose down" by commanding nose down trim.  The 737 Max, like all 737s, still have a manual elevator trim wheel that is quite large, that allows you to manually trim the airplane in the event of a runaway trim disconnect.  When you trim the elevator either electrically or if MCAS commands nose down trim, that manual trim wheel starts spinning (and making a loud clacking noise).  IF THAT MANUAL TRIM WHEEL is spinning/clacking and you are not commanding a trim movement with the electric trim controller, then that should be a big clue that you have a big issue that is either runaway trim or an MCAS intervention.  This was the big warning sign those less-than-well trained pilots with less-than-great air sense missed.

8.  As the 2 737 Max crashes illustrate, there is a huge difference in pilot training and pilot proficiency/air-sense between airlines of say the US, Britian, France, Austrailia, etc, and the airlines of emerging third world.  Do your homework.  Check their safety records.  Then decide whose airplanes you will fly on.  Pilot quality has a huge impact on safety, much greater than are you flying an Airbus or a Boeing.

Runaway pitch trim is no joke. I flew a plane that did that and while the passengers got themselves off the ceiling you had to pull back hard with one hand while simultaneously mashing the emergency trim interrupt, manually trim with the other hand, and pull the breaker for the pitch trim motor with your third hand. A 737 of any type adds another layer of difficulty because the pitch trim authority exceeds elevator authority by quite a bit. This means even with all your strength and all the hydraulics, full down trim goes down even with full up elevator. You can manually trim it, but the trim wheel turns something like 100 times, not 5 or 10. You are moving a big heavy loaded surface, to do it by hand requires a huge mechanical advantage which means a huge number of turns. There is a little handle that pops out to make it a bit easier. Pro Tip: Do not EVER hit the electric trim with that handle out. It caught my knee a glancing blow and it hurt bad enough, I was told a direct hit will break your knee.

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KIS.  Agree and concur on all you say.  Never meant to imply it was "easy" to handle.  Ton on cockpit coordination needs to occur.  

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4 hours ago, floater said:

who interred the scientist?

Back in the 80's you could sign up for a vacation/work experience in remote Russian territories with a team of archeologists. They would put you up in private homes nearby and dinner was an experience! There was a large full water-glass at my plate and when I took a drink I realized it was vodka. They thought I was a rookie.

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I have just completed reading (listening) to Peter Robinson's book "Flying Blind - The 737 MAX Tragedy and the Fall of Boeing"

https://www.amazon.com/Flying-Blind-Tragedy-Fall-Boeing/dp/0385546491 (free with an Audible trial)

If you have an interest about many of the on- and off-topic things discussed in this thread, you should take the time to read this book. 

A calm summary of the book is found in the FT if you are on the fence:

https://www.ft.com/content/dcd39dc6-ae3b-4203-9210-c321eac8f5e5

If you are of a certain age and grew up in Seattle, your dad (and perhaps mom) and everyone else's dad worked for Boeing either as an engineer, machinist or a factory worker.  Either way, you could afford a nice house, a new car every three years, a small cabin in the mountains, a power or sail boat and the opportunity to send your kids to a good college.

As a kid you were proud because maybe your dad got to tow the first 747 prototype out of the hangar, or brought home a moon boot or took you down to sneak you in to see the SST prototype the day before family day, or had an astronaut over for a dinner.  You always had the best graphics and stuff for oral reports and show-and-tell at school.  The doorstop thingy for the back door was a scrap part out of titanium.  Maybe the president of Boeing's daughter had a crush on you in Junior High because they lived just down the road and went to the same public school.

That was pretty much the scenario up to the 777 program, the last Boeing program where suppliers were valued partners, and Boeing both managed and took complete responsibility for programs and their outcome.

Then MacDonnell Douglas took over Boeing with Boeing's own money.  The book takes the story from there.

I'll leave it up to the readers/listeners to draw their own conclusions after digesting the book.

There definitely is old Boeing and new Boeing.  The old Boeing is remembered fondly, and today is dearly missed in Seattle.

 

boeing.thumb.jpg.156a5218d837931a21995dadae8a9733.jpg

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16 hours ago, Crash said:

KIS.  Agree and concur on all you say.  Never meant to imply it was "easy" to handle.  Ton on cockpit coordination needs to occur.  

I know someone who flew the 737 Max. His *entire training* was a video he was told to watch on his iPad :rolleyes: He said a lot of the inner workings of the "new and improved" trim system were not really covered.

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An FYI on aircraft and "grandfathering":

An airplane flies under the type certificate it was built under forever. Whatever the requirements were to build and certify a transport aircraft were in 1930, the DC-3 met them and still flies in 2021 on that type certificate. The FAA does not make certification requirements retroactive, airplanes are too big an investment to suddenly turn an entire fleet into scrap.

What they do do is called an AD for Airworthiness Directive. To keep flying, an airplane must comply with all relevant ADs. As planes age problems develop that were not foreseen in 1935 or 1965. Here is one for the DC-3:

https://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgAD.nsf/AOCADSearch/8A063C531E6CBC9386256A0800650232?OpenDocument

This includes X-ray examination:  Inspect the wing in accordance with McDonnell Douglas Service Rework Drawing SR03578001, dated March 11, 1988; or McDonnell Douglas Service Rework Drawing SR03578002, Revision A, dated September 26, 1988; for the applicable airplanes, using the visual and X-ray techniques specified. Repeat the visual inspection thereafter at intervals not to exceed 2,000 hours time-in-service. 

X-raying airplane parts was not routine maintenance in 1935, but now these airplanes are around 80 years old it is now. There is usually some vigorous back and forth when new ADs are proposed, owners frequently think either the FAA is overreacting or the manufacturer is trying a back door approach to grounding an old model they don't want to support by lobbying for an AD that no one could afford.

The CG rule on passenger egress is like an AD - comply or lose your certification to carry passengers.

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I have a few buddies with a few warbirds in OZ
The smart ones describe the WWII stuff as ..when you are young and sharp and the only thing you train for and think about every day is that plane you have a chance to survive flying it.
If you think you can fly it once a month..good luck

Yes the 737 is still flying on its original type approval AFAIK? Thats what the cheap airlines want..

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4 minutes ago, Sailabout said:

I have a few buddies with a few warbirds in OZ
The smart ones describe the WWII stuff as ..when you are young and sharp and the only thing you train for and think about every day is that plane you have a chance to survive flying it.
If you think you can fly it once a month..good luck

Yes the 737 is still flying on its original type approval AFAIK? Thats what the cheap airlines want..

The 737 will fly under the original type certification for the next 100 years, as will every other airplane. I think the question is will the Max be allowed to be a "737" or forced to split off to a new type and thus require the *pilot* to be specifically certified to fly it. That was the whole deal with the goofy trim system, not to avoid a new type cert of the airplane, it was to avoid training pilots. Boeing had two ways to go, either fix the trim system or get rid of it and then have all the pilots go back to school for a 737-Max type rating. They chose to fix the trim.

There was a third option that the FAA could have done that is rarely used - special flight training rules outside of type ratings. The Robinson R-22 got this because of very light rotor blades, they had a pretty bad accident record until specific training was required. The MU-2 got this, it wasn't heavy enough to require a type rating, but the spoilers used for roll control instead of ailerons were a trap for pilots not used to them.

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40 minutes ago, kent_island_sailor said:

An FYI on aircraft and "grandfathering":

An airplane flies under the type certificate it was built under forever. Whatever the requirements were to build and certify a transport aircraft were in 1930, the DC-3 met them and still flies in 2021 on that type certificate. The FAA does not make certification requirements retroactive, airplanes are too big an investment to suddenly turn an entire fleet into scrap.

What they do do is called an AD for Airworthiness Directive. To keep flying, an airplane must comply with all relevant ADs. As planes age problems develop that were not foreseen in 1935 or 1965. Here is one for the DC-3:

https://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgAD.nsf/AOCADSearch/8A063C531E6CBC9386256A0800650232?OpenDocument

This includes X-ray examination:  Inspect the wing in accordance with McDonnell Douglas Service Rework Drawing SR03578001, dated March 11, 1988; or McDonnell Douglas Service Rework Drawing SR03578002, Revision A, dated September 26, 1988; for the applicable airplanes, using the visual and X-ray techniques specified. Repeat the visual inspection thereafter at intervals not to exceed 2,000 hours time-in-service. 

X-raying airplane parts was not routine maintenance in 1935, but now these airplanes are around 80 years old it is now. There is usually some vigorous back and forth when new ADs are proposed, owners frequently think either the FAA is overreacting or the manufacturer is trying a back door approach to grounding an old model they don't want to support by lobbying for an AD that no one could afford.

The CG rule on passenger egress is like an AD - comply or lose your certification to carry passengers.

Very interesting airplane discussion. Hpwever the USCG rule is npt like FAA AD. The USCG rule applies across all boats. AD are very model specific.

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16 hours ago, Boathavn said:


I have just completed reading (listening) to Peter Robinson's book "Flying Blind - The 737 MAX Tragedy and the Fall of Boeing"

https://www.amazon.com/Flying-Blind-Tragedy-Fall-Boeing/dp/0385546491 (free with an Audible trial)

If you have an interest about many of the on- and off-topic things discussed in this thread, you should take the time to read this book. 

A calm summary of the book is found in the FT if you are on the fence:

https://www.ft.com/content/dcd39dc6-ae3b-4203-9210-c321eac8f5e5

If you are of a certain age and grew up in Seattle, your dad (and perhaps mom) and everyone else's dad worked for Boeing either as an engineer, machinist or a factory worker.  Either way, you could afford a nice house, a new car every three years, a small cabin in the mountains, a power or sail boat and the opportunity to send your kids to a good college.

As a kid you were proud because maybe your dad got to tow the first 747 prototype out of the hangar, or brought home a moon boot or took you down to sneak you in to see the SST prototype the day before family day, or had an astronaut over for a dinner.  You always had the best graphics and stuff for oral reports and show-and-tell at school.  The doorstop thingy for the back door was a scrap part out of titanium.  Maybe the president of Boeing's daughter had a crush on you in Junior High because they lived just down the road and went to the same public school.

That was pretty much the scenario up to the 777 program, the last Boeing program where suppliers were valued partners, and Boeing both managed and took complete responsibility for programs and their outcome.

Then MacDonnell Douglas took over Boeing with Boeing's own money.  The book takes the story from there.

I'll leave it up to the readers/listeners to draw their own conclusions after digesting the book.

There definitely is old Boeing and new Boeing.  The old Boeing is remembered fondly, and today is dearly missed in Seattle.

 

boeing.thumb.jpg.156a5218d837931a21995dadae8a9733.jpg

That’s why as a young man I always wanted to follow my father in engineering and live and work in Seattle.  As it turned out, despite a real talent in math, people wiht dyslexia have real issues learning math quick enough to meet the time lines required to pass calculus classes.  So much for engineering especially for a fellow with a super talent in History.  

I miss being able to depend on our home grown airliner builder(s).  Times are so bad, I frankly don’t feel comfortable in an aircraft anymore unless am in the left or right seat of the cockpit.  Nor do I feel comfortable sailing downwind without a preventer rigged.  Maybe it has to do with age.  

I still question the Carter administration for deregulating the airlines.  It was great for those folks who fly from major hub to major hub, but the rest of the nation really can’t afford to fly.  

I have a good friend who travels to Europe frequently.  Recently he priced tickets to Amsterdam. Monroe, Louisiana to Amsterdam was $3000.00 higher than flying from Jackson Mississippi to Amsterdam, just 140 miles further east.  Not an typo Three Thousand Dollars; It is ridiculous.  

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On 10/21/2020 at 1:44 PM, kinardly said:

We just had a case a couple of months back where a bunch of Marines in an amphibious assault craft were drowned when their "track" sank off San Clemente Island. I recall riding one ashore at Pendleton as an NROTC midshipman and it was one of the scariest experiences of my life. We were supposed to have the low bulk, inflatable life preservers but there weren't enough of them so we climbed down through what might have been a 30 inch diameter hatch wearing our kapok Type Is, full web gear, pack, rifle and tin pot and sat, elbow to elbow on benches. There's a long vertical double door opening overhead that's supposed to open to allow you to swim out if the thing floods and goes down but water pressure will hold it closed if a pressure relief valve on the floor fails to open. Maybe one or two will make it out the circular hatch before everyone else dies, maybe. Plowing through the swells, water splashed through the edges of that hatch onto us. When we finally made it to the beach and the ramp dropped, you could've timed a four flat forty yard dash from every one of us. Reading the accounts of this year's Marine's tragedy made me relive the claustrophobic fear more than fifty years later and now, reading the Conception details is going to give me nightmares thinking about those poor people.

I have often wondered how the military persuaded anyone to be first in line to disembark from a landing craft on an enemy beach. 'Saving Private Ryan' certainly didn't further my understanding. I think I may just have received my answer.

Oh.....and thank you for your service. The years do not diminish our gratitude.

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20 hours ago, kent_island_sailor said:

Runaway pitch trim is no joke. I flew a plane that did that and while the passengers got themselves off the ceiling you had to pull back hard with one hand while simultaneously mashing the emergency trim interrupt, manually trim with the other hand, and pull the breaker for the pitch trim motor with your third hand. A 737 of any type adds another layer of difficulty because the pitch trim authority exceeds elevator authority by quite a bit. This means even with all your strength and all the hydraulics, full down trim goes down even with full up elevator. You can manually trim it, but the trim wheel turns something like 100 times, not 5 or 10. You are moving a big heavy loaded surface, to do it by hand requires a huge mechanical advantage which means a huge number of turns. There is a little handle that pops out to make it a bit easier. Pro Tip: Do not EVER hit the electric trim with that handle out. It caught my knee a glancing blow and it hurt bad enough, I was told a direct hit will break your knee.

I wish people who know what they are talking about would not disrupt a thread on Sailing Anarchy with facts and real life experience. If we wanted the truth and real insights, we wouldn't come to SA. Please take it elsewhere or we will have to report you to the new ownership. 

Its people like you who give Ivermectin a bad name.

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1 hour ago, fastyacht said:

Very interesting airplane discussion. Hpwever the USCG rule is npt like FAA AD. The USCG rule applies across all boats. AD are very model specific.

I guess it is more like a new FAR. Weather radar was not required for Part 121 back in the day and now it is. That applies to all airplanes, not just one type.

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1 hour ago, Sailabout said:

Will people get in a 737 Max?

Will they be asking the airline what model plane is flying?

I just fly on a United one to Maui, just after Christmas.  Nice new airplane.  Nice ride.  It was almost full of passengers and had a full bag of fuel, but accelerated smartly down the runway at LAX, and climbed out well too.  No complaints from this former USN backseater.

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13 hours ago, Santanasailor said:

.  Times are so bad, I frankly don’t feel comfortable in an aircraft anymore unless am in the left or right seat of the cockpit.  Nor do I feel comfortable sailing downwind without a preventer rigged.  Maybe it has to do with age.  
 

You do realize that transport category aircraft are safer now than ever in history, that the drop in fatal accidents in the US over the past 20 years is unprecedented, that AQP or whatever that is called really works, and that even the 3rd world is catching up, albeit not to our standards yet...

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1 minute ago, fastyacht said:

You do realize that transport category aircraft are safer now than ever in history, that the drop in fatal accidents in the US over the past 20 years is unprecedented, that AQP or whatever that is called really works, and that even the 3rd world is catching up, albeit not to our standards yet...

I also don't want any seat but the front left. It isn't the airplanes I worry about, it is the passengers.

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4 hours ago, fastyacht said:

You do realize that transport category aircraft are safer now than ever in history, that the drop in fatal accidents in the US over the past 20 years is unprecedented, that AQP or whatever that is called really works, and that even the 3rd world is catching up, albeit not to our standards yet...

planes are almost idiot proof these days but as we have seen in the last 20 years they keep making better idiots and crash perfectly good planes.

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