Aegean lawsuit

[Somebody Else]

That report is a blinding glimpse of the very obvious.

With no survivors or witnesses it is unlikely we'll ever get more resolution from this.

 

[walterbshaffer]

What is the jurisdiction if a guy from Iowa drives a car off one of those mega cliffs on the toll road south of Rosarito?

My US Auto Insurance covers me automatically in Mexico if I am within 75 miles of the US border. I crashed my car near Rosarito and my US policy paid for the repair. If there had been injuries or death then the US insurance company would be on the hook. (I also had Mexican liability insurance --their agent came to the scene. If the cops had come, the MX agent's presence would have been helpful.)

I did not ask about coverage - I asked about jurisdiction. (unless you are implying that NAFTA or some other treaty gives jurisdiction to the venue in which the insurance was contracted for?)

 

[jwaldron]

http://media.ussaili...Report_2012.htm

report posted today

119 pages of fluff. There's little substance there.

• We get the RayMarine Model ST 6002 User Handbook appended, but no one has asked or attempted to answer the question: had any of the crew other than the Captain read the handbook? What purpose does the handbook serve in the report other than as padding? Does it support some finding of the committee? If so, which finding?
  
• We get the power point slides from the pre-race NOSA "Racer to Win" Seminar for participants in the race. Is there any indication that the Captain or any of the crew attended? Or got prints of the slides? If not, why is it relevant to the incident?
  
• Where is the finding (and reminder to all racers and sailors more generally) that the skipper bears responsibility (and authority) for all the areas addressed in the report whether others perfom well or not?
  

Even with the lack of more facts - even in attempting to avoid litigation or the threat of litigation - there is more substance that can - and should - properly be found in the review of the incident. IMHO, the crash was a self-evident case of human error and not an act of God. If the committee cannot come fully to grips with such a fundamental aspect of the incident, they have defaulted on the primary potential utility of the investigation for the sailing community and have neutered their own role.

Those who enter races in the "cruising classes" with crews with limited capabilities and training in the basics of safety at sea - including such niceties as setting waypoints and waypoint alarms, keeping a watch, not crashing into large, rocky islands, etc. - need to be impressed with their authority and their responsibility as master of the vessel. And, to the extent such impressions can be gotten to crew, it is a good idea that they be appropriately cautioned about all these matters as well.

In my opinion, such "near beer" as the "new" report serves only to camouflage the underlying issues and encourages the "cruising class" to (continue to) treat the N2E race as the "World's Largest Floating Cocktail Party." It is an opportunity lost.

 

[estarzinger]

 

· We get the RayMarine Model ST 6002 User Handbook appended, .... What purpose does the handbook serve in the report other than as padding? Does it support some finding of the committee? If so, which finding?

 

The fact that this autopilot continues on its previous course after going thru a waypoint is fundamental to the incident.

 

· We get the power point slides from the pre-race NOSA "Racer to Win" Seminar for participants in the race. . . . , why is it relevant to the incident?

 

This is directly relevant to one of the recommendations: “The panel recommends that NOSA’s Pre Race Seminar include the advice to set a Course that does not intersect the Coronado Islands. The Panel also recommends that The Pre Race Seminar include information on the zones of light obscuration from the lights on South Coronado Island. (Not all charts used in this race are marked with this information.)”

 

· Where is the finding (and reminder to all racers and sailors more generally) that the skipper bears responsibility ....?

 

The report states it's perspective on this in the first sentence of the first recommendation :”The panel reminds all sailors that a lookout is a requirement for racing and safe vessel operation.” You may disagree with this perspective, and believe that the captain was solely responsible, but the reports stated perspective is that the captain and the watch keepers were all responsible for maintaining a proper watch.

IMHO, the crash was a self-evident case of human error and not an act of God.

 

The first sentence of the findings is: "The panel determined that a key element of the accident was likely an inadequate lookout". That sounds to me rather like a finding of human error rather than an act of god.

 

 

The recommendation on hand steering over autopilot usage would be a significant change to the race if implemented.

The above is, of course, all just my opinion and interpretation and not any sort of official statement from the panel or US Sailing.

 

[DoRag]

http://media.ussaili...Report_2012.htm

report posted today

119 pages of fluff. There's little substance there.

• We get the RayMarine Model ST 6002 User Handbook appended, but no one has asked or attempted to answer the question: had any of the crew other than the Captain read the handbook? What purpose does the handbook serve in the report other than as padding? Does it support some finding of the committee? If so, which finding?
  
• We get the power point slides from the pre-race NOSA "Racer to Win" Seminar for participants in the race. Is there any indication that the Captain or any of the crew attended? Or got prints of the slides? If not, why is it relevant to the incident?
  
• Where is the finding (and reminder to all racers and sailors more generally) that the skipper bears responsibility (and authority) for all the areas addressed in the report whether others perfom well or not?
  

Even with the lack of more facts - even in attempting to avoid litigation or the threat of litigation - there is more substance that can - and should - properly be found in the review of the incident. IMHO, the crash was a self-evident case of human error and not an act of God. If the committee cannot come fully to grips with such a fundamental aspect of the incident, they have defaulted on the primary potential utility of the investigation for the sailing community and have neutered their own role.

Those who enter races in the "cruising classes" with crews with limited capabilities and training in the basics of safety at sea - including such niceties as setting waypoints and waypoint alarms, keeping a watch, not crashing into large, rocky islands, etc. - need to be impressed with their authority and their responsibility as master of the vessel. And, to the extent such impressions can be gotten to crew, it is a good idea that they be appropriately cautioned about all these matters as well.

In my opinion, such "near beer" as the "new" report serves only to camouflage the underlying issues and encourages the "cruising class" to (continue to) treat the N2E race as the "World's Largest Floating Cocktail Party." It is an opportunity lost.

The report is a dissappointment in many respects. Many would like to have the question answered as to the experience of the captain and crew, including any formal training. The question around the captain being a licensed USCG skipper should be answered.

If thse folks were inexperienced, then NOSA could be held liable for the lack of action to ensure entrants were aware of the risks and had adequate training to safely participate in the event. To allow autopilots in a race is absurd. To not set a requirement for at least two people on deck at all times is absurd.

What was the point in the US Sailing report?

 

[estarzinger]

Many would like to have the question answered as to the experience of the captain and crew, including any formal training. The question around the captain being a licensed USCG skipper should be answered.

Do,

The reports states the facts: that the captain had done a half dozen of these races and been a life long sailor.

I have already answered the USCG ticket question - NO. You can either believe me or submit a FOIA request yourself if you care so much.

With the captain dead there was no way for the panel to form or state any further objective assessment of his capabilities. He was more 'experienced' than many, but less than some. There is just not much you can make of it.

 

[K38BOB]

More lights, bigger chart plotters and redundant GPS units stowed in sea bags are of little value to the crew that has lost situational awareness. IMO, our many modern electronic crutches increase the risk for loss of situational awareness.

Here are the last seconds of three airline pilots who got distracted by a warning light and lost situational awareness. In this case three train guys killed a large number of people by fiddling with on of the gadgets on board.

First Officer: We did something to the altitude!

Capt. Bob: What?

First Officer: We’re still at 2000—right?

Capt. Bob: Hey—what’s happening here!

Control tower: Eastern 401, I’ve lost you on radar—and your transponder. What is your altitude?

Pilot: Miami Approach, this is National 611. We just saw a big flash—looked like it was out west. Don’t know what it means, but we wanted to let you know.

Pilot: Lan Chile 451—we saw a big flash—a general flash, like some kind of explosion.

Capt. Bob Loft’s last words were spoken on approach to Miami International Airport on a clear December night with 10 flight attendants and 162 passengers on board. With 30,000 hours of flying experience Bob piloted his airworthy Lockheed L-1011 (Eastern 401) into the Florida swamp in 1972. Pilots call this CFIT or Controlled Flight Into Terrain and it’s a leading cause of airplane accidents responsible for over 9,000 deaths in the history of aviation.

The Airfrance crash into the ocean was a pretty sad read..don't remember all of it but they flew it into the water http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_447

" The aircraft crashed following an aerodynamic stall caused by inconsistent airspeed sensor readings, the disengagement of the autopilot, and the pilot making nose-up inputs despite stall warnings, causing a fatal loss of airspeed and a sharp descent. The pilots had not received specific training in "manual airplane handling of approach to stall and stall recovery at high altitude"; this was not a standard training requirement at the time of the accident.[8][1][9] "

 

[K38BOB]

 

· We get the RayMarine Model ST 6002 User Handbook appended, .... What purpose does the handbook serve in the report other than as padding? Does it support some finding of the committee? If so, which finding?

 

The fact that this autopilot continues on its previous course after going thru a waypoint is fundamental to the incident.

 

· We get the power point slides from the pre-race NOSA "Racer to Win" Seminar for participants in the race. . . . , why is it relevant to the incident?

 

This is directly relevant to one of the recommendations: “The panel recommends that NOSA’s Pre Race Seminar include the advice to set a Course that does not intersect the Coronado Islands. The Panel also recommends that The Pre Race Seminar include information on the zones of light obscuration from the lights on South Coronado Island. (Not all charts used in this race are marked with this information.)”

 

· Where is the finding (and reminder to all racers and sailors more generally) that the skipper bears responsibility ....?

 

The report states it's perspective on this in the first sentence of the first recommendation :”The panel reminds all sailors that a lookout is a requirement for racing and safe vessel operation.” You may disagree with this perspective, and believe that the captain was solely responsible, but the reports stated perspective is that the captain and the watch keepers were all responsible for maintaining a proper watch.

IMHO, the crash was a self-evident case of human error and not an act of God.

 

The first sentence of the findings is: "The panel determined that a key element of the accident was likely an inadequate lookout". That sounds to me rather like a finding of human error rather than an act of god.

 

 

The recommendation on hand steering over autopilot usage would be a significant change to the race if implemented.

The above is, of course, all just my opinion and interpretation and not any sort of official statement from the panel or US Sailing.

For the same reason I don't like specific rules on how to safely round an island, I don't like rules that say specifically avoid this island. Or is everyone convinced that Coronados island are the only thing that can be run into on the course? now and forever?

 

[stranded]

[ QUOTE ]

For the same reason I don't like specific rules on how to safely round an island, I don't like rules that say specifically avoid this island. Or is everyone convinced that Coronados island are the only thing that can be run into on the course? now and forever?

[ UNQUOTE ]

I am sure this would be well covered in the Sailing Directions ( PILOT )

NOAA also produces several nautical publications. For example, the United States Coast Pilot® is a series of nautical books with a variety of important information for navigators to supplement the nautical chart.

How many would have read the relevant parts of that ?

Perhaps the club should require a copy on every boat that enters ?

 

[DoRag]

Many would like to have the question answered as to the experience of the captain and crew, including any formal training. The question around the captain being a licensed USCG skipper should be answered.

Do,

The reports states the facts: that the captain had done a half dozen of these races and been a life long sailor.

I have already answered the USCG ticket question - NO. You can either believe me or submit a FOIA request yourself if you care so much.

With the captain dead there was no way for the panel to form or state any further objective assessment of his capabilities. He was more 'experienced' than many, but less than some. There is just not much you can make of it.

It seems to me that because you participated in a number of Ensenada Races does not, in an of itself, make you an "experienced" sailor. All Aegean ever did was to motor sail to Ensenada several times. Kinda like the typical SoCal motor sailor that believes going to Catalina for a weekend in the summer qualifies him as a safe blue water sailor. My YC is full of those folks and they all have a very distorted view of their capabilities as a sailor under difficult situations. Their boathandling skills are usually a joke and they can't dock in any kind of wind.

Additionally, the same comment holds for being a "lifelong" sailor. Was the "lifelong" sailor simply motoring about on autopilot for a lifetime?

So, I think his experience needs to be examined more closely. What professional training did he have? Could he navigate without all the electronic garbage he added to the boat? Did he know enough to demand rotating two person watches?

US Sailing might conclude those sailors were competent, but they hardly looked into the matter and present zero evidence to support that contention. The fact that these folks ran hard into an island bigger than an aircraft carrier seems to indicate that they weren't all that experienced.

 

[jwaldron]

Many would like to have the question answered as to the experience of the captain and crew, including any formal training. The question around the captain being a licensed USCG skipper should be answered.

Do,

The reports states the facts: that the captain had done a half dozen of these races and been a life long sailor.

I have already answered the USCG ticket question - NO. You can either believe me or submit a FOIA request yourself if you care so much.

With the captain dead there was no way for the panel to form or state any further objective assessment of his capabilities. He was more 'experienced' than many, but less than some. There is just not much you can make of it.

It seems to me that because you participated in a number of Ensenada Races does not, in an of itself, make you an "experienced" sailor. All Aegean ever did was to motor sail to Ensenada several times. Kinda like the typical SoCal motor sailor that believes going to Catalina for a weekend in the summer qualifies him as a safe blue water sailor. My YC is full of those folks and they all have a very distorted view of their capabilities as a sailor under difficult situations. Their boathandling skills are usually a joke and they can't dock in any kind of wind.

Additionally, the same comment holds for being a "lifelong" sailor. Was the "lifelong" sailor simply motoring about on autopilot for a lifetime?

So, I think his experience needs to be examined more closely. What professional training did he have? Could he navigate without all the electronic garbage he added to the boat? Did he know enough to demand rotating two person watches?

US Sailing might conclude those sailors were competent, but they hardly looked into the matter and present zero evidence to support that contention. The fact that these folks ran hard into an island bigger than an aircraft carrier seems to indicate that they weren't all that experienced.

Or competent. Res ipsa loquitur!

 

[estarzinger]

What professional training did he have?

If you mean professional marine training - None. But relatively few offshore racers have 'professional training'. The fact he did not is not at all extraordinary.

Could he navigate without all the electronic garbage he added to the boat?

Yes

Did he know enough to demand rotating two person watches?

Yes, at least we know he did in previous races. (By the way, I agree that this should have been mentioned in the report)

The fact that these folks ran hard into an island bigger than an aircraft carrier seems to indicate that they weren't all that experienced.

 

No, that's not at all a valid conclusion. Well trained and experienced pilots fly planes into the ground, well trained and experienced navy captains run into land and other vessels. The unfortunate fact of human existence is that well trained and experienced people do make mistakes.

all just my opinion

 

[silent bob]

Another Lawsuit, this time against SPOT & Amazon.com!

 

[Great Red Shark]

Jesus, while I certainly feel bad for the family of those aboard, that seems like a blatant money-grab to me - just because something bad has happened doesn't mean you get paid.

from story:

" Mavromatis’ boat became disabled about 1:35 a.m., leaving him and his crew “in dire need of emergency assistance,” the suit states.

Mavromatis activated the SPOT system on board his boat, but it did not put him in contact with emergency help, according to the complaint.

As a result of the system’s alleged failures, Mavromatis “suffered severe injuries and ultimately death,” the suit states. "

Does anyone know if the SPOT 'panic button' WAS activated ? or if it just went offline ? And either way that is answered - could IMMEDIATE action have saved that crew, so far offshore, injured, in the dark, and in the water ?

What the lawsuit will likely do is add expense to the type of service SPOT and others offer.

But that part about the SYSTEMS FAILURES resulting in death ? Oh, come ON.

 

[estarzinger]

^^

The SOS button was pushed, and GEOS's response was let's say "clearly less than optimal", but they also have all sorts of small print in their contract to protect them.

A faster, better response might (or might not) have helped, we just don't know. If they had activated an epirb the uscg helo would probably have been on site within 45-60 mins, with the Spot/Geos response they did not get on site until the next day.

Spot and inreach's strength is in allowing family and friend to follow along, but If you want to get rescued, an epirb is MUCH better than spot/inreach. The marketing has obscured this fact, and could easily be considered mis-leading.

 

[Delta Blues]

I can't stand this. Here's how I see it in my humble opinion - My husband moronically drove his boat right into the side of an island. On board he had modern navigation equipment, he had the ability to read charts and see that this Island was there and that he was heading straight for it. He had decades of experience. He hit the panic button on the SPOT, the way he set the SPOT up was when the Panic button was hit, the responders were to call his/my house. But you know, it was in the middle of the night when my phone rang, I didn't bother to get it. So I let the opportunity pass to get involved in tracking down his whereabouts. But due to his own ineptitude, not only did he drive the boat right into the island, destroying the boat completely, he took 4 soles with it.

It must be someone else's fault.

 

[MR.CLEAN]

he took 4 soles with it.

 

[Somebody Else]

Delta Blues, I like the cut of your jib.

 

[Delta Blues]

he took 4 soles with it.

In that case, make it 8 soles. Or 4 souls.

 

[some dude]

I can't stand this. Here's how I see it in my humble opinion - My husband moronically drove his boat right into the side of an island. On board he had modern navigation equipment, he had the ability to read charts and see that this Island was there and that he was heading straight for it. He had decades of experience. He hit the panic button on the SPOT, the way he set the SPOT up was when the Panic button was hit, the responders were to call his/my house. But you know, it was in the middle of the night when my phone rang, I didn't bother to get it. So I let the opportunity pass to get involved in tracking down his whereabouts. But due to his own ineptitude, not only did he drive the boat right into the island, destroying the boat completely, he took 4 soles with it.

It must be someone else's fault.

Word

He plowed right into an island, on autopilot, with everyone asleep. Sorry for the families, but that's a pretty clear cut case of natural selection. Some of the monkeys fall out of the tree, and fancy electronics can't save all of them.