RAINMAKER DISMASTED OFF HATTERAS IN GALE

joneisberg

Super Anarchist
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0
At any rate, I am learning alot from this saga. For instance,I didn't realize that calling for a helo rescue was the favored Plan B among recreational sailors now. In my naivety, I always pretty much figured that calling to be rescued means I've already exhausted all my other options: my boat is dead in the water and can't be jury-rigged, is sinking and can't be saved, and I've already abandoned to my liferaft.
What, have you been living in a cave in Afghanistan for the last decade, or something?

:)

 
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RKoch

Super Anarchist
14,865
350
da 'burg
"At any rate, I am learning alot from this saga. For instance, I didn't realize that calling for a helo rescue was the favored Plan B among recreational sailors now. In my naivety, I always pretty much figured that calling to be rescued means I've already exhausted all my other options: my boat is dead in the water and can't be jury-rigged, is sinking and can't be saved, and I've already abandoned to my liferaft."

For the record you cannot summon a USCG Helo. Any licensed mariner has a duty and obligation to notify the Coast Guard or equivalent when lives are in peril. The USCG then determines what actions and assets to put into play. A professional mariner who delays informing the authorities when the safety of the ship or person is in jeopardy would be derelict of their duties. In this case you had three(3) guys with tickets with passengers aboard and a vessel dead in the water during a storm.

PAN PAN-The urgency signal PAN PAN is used when the safety of the ship or person is in jeopardy.

MAYDAY-The distress signal MAYDAY is used to indicate a station is threatened by grave and imminent danger and requests immediate assistance

EPIRB is supposed to be limited to "grave and imminent situations"....

The three guys with tickets had absolutely no choice outside of notifying the USCG. Any delay with the hope of just dealing with the circumstances onboard without outside notification was never a responsible option.
The rig was successfully cleared away. According to PJ the boat had no further damage, and was not taking on water. They were uncomfortable, no doubt, but were safe aboard a 55' $2.5m carbon life raft. Where is the grave and imminent danger? They should have issued a Pan-Pan.
 
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Ed Lada

Super Anarchist
20,187
5,834
Poland
"At any rate, I am learning alot from this saga. For instance, I didn't realize that calling for a helo rescue was the favored Plan B among recreational sailors now. In my naivety, I always pretty much figured that calling to be rescued means I've already exhausted all my other options: my boat is dead in the water and can't be jury-rigged, is sinking and can't be saved, and I've already abandoned to my liferaft."

For the record you cannot summon a USCG Helo. Any licensed mariner has a duty and obligation to notify the Coast Guard or equivalent when lives are in peril. The USCG then determines what actions and assets to put into play. A professional mariner who delays informing the authorities when the safety of the ship or person is in jeopardy would be derelict of their duties. In this case you had three(3) guys with tickets with passengers aboard and a vessel dead in the water during a storm.

PAN PAN-The urgency signal PAN PAN is used when the safety of the ship or person is in jeopardy.

MAYDAY-The distress signal MAYDAY is used to indicate a station is threatened by grave and imminent danger and requests immediate assistance

EPIRB is supposed to be limited to "grave and imminent situations"....

The three guys with tickets had absolutely no choice outside of notifying the USCG. Any delay with the hope of just dealing with the circumstances onboard without outside notification was never a responsible option.
The rig was successfully cleared away. According to PJ the boat had no further damage, and was not taking on water. They were uncomfortable, no doubt, but were safe aboard a 55' $2.5m carbon life raft. Where is the grave and imminent danger? They should have issued a Pan-Pan.
Neither you nor anyone else offering their advice here, were there, you have no idea what they SHOULD have done. But since offering uninformed, caustic, unsolicited opinions is a blood sport on SA, please carry on.

 

DryArmour

Super Anarchist
"At any rate, I am learning alot from this saga. For instance, I didn't realize that calling for a helo rescue was the favored Plan B among recreational sailors now. In my naivety, I always pretty much figured that calling to be rescued means I've already exhausted all my other options: my boat is dead in the water and can't be jury-rigged, is sinking and can't be saved, and I've already abandoned to my liferaft."

For the record you cannot summon a USCG Helo. Any licensed mariner has a duty and obligation to notify the Coast Guard or equivalent when lives are in peril. The USCG then determines what actions and assets to put into play. A professional mariner who delays informing the authorities when the safety of the ship or person is in jeopardy would be derelict of their duties. In this case you had three(3) guys with tickets with passengers aboard and a vessel dead in the water during a storm.

PAN PAN-The urgency signal PAN PAN is used when the safety of the ship or person is in jeopardy.

MAYDAY-The distress signal MAYDAY is used to indicate a station is threatened by grave and imminent danger and requests immediate assistance

EPIRB is supposed to be limited to "grave and imminent situations"....

The three guys with tickets had absolutely no choice outside of notifying the USCG. Any delay with the hope of just dealing with the circumstances onboard without outside notification was never a responsible option.
The rig was successfully cleared away. According to PJ the boat had no further damage, and was not taking on water. They were uncomfortable, no doubt, but were safe aboard a 55' $2.5m carbon life raft. Where is the grave and imminent danger? They should have issued a Pan-Pan.
That is likely what many of us would have done (Called Pan-Pan) but unless you were there it is difficult to second guess a guy with as much sea time as the Captain has. I agree that there are a LOT of lessons to be learned from this event and I hope the conversation is kept as constructive as possible to that end. I know that from a weather routing standpoint I am continuing to glean information from this thread that will help me do a better job for my clients in the future. Commanders did the routing and from the package I have seen they knew what was coming and advised the crew of the front's passage.

 
"At any rate, I am learning alot from this saga. For instance, I didn't realize that calling for a helo rescue was the favored Plan B among recreational sailors now. In my naivety, I always pretty much figured that calling to be rescued means I've already exhausted all my other options: my boat is dead in the water and can't be jury-rigged, is sinking and can't be saved, and I've already abandoned to my liferaft."

For the record you cannot summon a USCG Helo. Any licensed mariner has a duty and obligation to notify the Coast Guard or equivalent when lives are in peril. The USCG then determines what actions and assets to put into play. A professional mariner who delays informing the authorities when the safety of the ship or person is in jeopardy would be derelict of their duties. In this case you had three(3) guys with tickets with passengers aboard and a vessel dead in the water during a storm.

PAN PAN-The urgency signal PAN PAN is used when the safety of the ship or person is in jeopardy.

MAYDAY-The distress signal MAYDAY is used to indicate a station is threatened by grave and imminent danger and requests immediate assistance

EPIRB is supposed to be limited to "grave and imminent situations"....

The three guys with tickets had absolutely no choice outside of notifying the USCG. Any delay with the hope of just dealing with the circumstances onboard without outside notification was never a responsible option.
The rig was successfully cleared away. According to PJ the boat had no further damage, and was not taking on water. They were uncomfortable, no doubt, but were safe aboard a 55' $2.5m carbon life raft. Where is the grave and imminent danger? They should have issued a Pan-Pan.
That is likely what many of us would have done (Called Pan-Pan) but unless you were there it is difficult to second guess a guy with as much sea time as the Captain has. I agree that there are a LOT of lessons to be learned from this event and I hope the conversation is kept as constructive as possible to that end. I know that from a weather routing standpoint I am continuing to glean information from this thread that will help me do a better job for my clients in the future. Commanders did the routing and from the package I have seen they knew what was coming and advised the crew of the front's passage.
As Clean, SA, and others continue to withhold facts. We have no idea what they called and when. A simple telephone call to the USCG with a courtesy update and suggested check in schedule could have been converted by the Watch or District Commander to a defacto May Day or aerial look see... My point the captain had no choice and the clear duty to inform the SAR rescue authorities of the predicament. That duty started when the rig went over the side or onto the boat. There is never anyone who can fully predict with reasonable and rational accuracy the next and future cascading failure and any error than may come along with those events in the dark.

 

RKoch

Super Anarchist
14,865
350
da 'burg
"At any rate, I am learning alot from this saga. For instance, I didn't realize that calling for a helo rescue was the favored Plan B among recreational sailors now. In my naivety, I always pretty much figured that calling to be rescued means I've already exhausted all my other options: my boat is dead in the water and can't be jury-rigged, is sinking and can't be saved, and I've already abandoned to my liferaft."

For the record you cannot summon a USCG Helo. Any licensed mariner has a duty and obligation to notify the Coast Guard or equivalent when lives are in peril. The USCG then determines what actions and assets to put into play. A professional mariner who delays informing the authorities when the safety of the ship or person is in jeopardy would be derelict of their duties. In this case you had three(3) guys with tickets with passengers aboard and a vessel dead in the water during a storm.

PAN PAN-The urgency signal PAN PAN is used when the safety of the ship or person is in jeopardy.

MAYDAY-The distress signal MAYDAY is used to indicate a station is threatened by grave and imminent danger and requests immediate assistance

EPIRB is supposed to be limited to "grave and imminent situations"....

The three guys with tickets had absolutely no choice outside of notifying the USCG. Any delay with the hope of just dealing with the circumstances onboard without outside notification was never a responsible option.
The rig was successfully cleared away. According to PJ the boat had no further damage, and was not taking on water. They were uncomfortable, no doubt, but were safe aboard a 55' $2.5m carbon life raft. Where is the grave and imminent danger? They should have issued a Pan-Pan.
That is likely what many of us would have done (Called Pan-Pan) but unless you were there it is difficult to second guess a guy with as much sea time as the Captain has. I agree that there are a LOT of lessons to be learned from this event and I hope the conversation is kept as constructive as possible to that end. I know that from a weather routing standpoint I am continuing to glean information from this thread that will help me do a better job for my clients in the future. Commanders did the routing and from the package I have seen they knew what was coming and advised the crew of the front's passage.
Of course, you're assuming the captain made the call to push the button. IMO, it's very possible the inexperienced RO pushed the button. Perhaps that detail will emerge in Part 2 or 3, or perhaps not. We shall see.
 

MR.CLEAN

Moderator
Front page is broken at the moment. Here's Part 2, with a frame grab showing a tiny bit of the carnage.

When we left Rainmaker skipper Chris Bailet, the Gunboat 55 was being run over by a freight train of wind, and Chris had just made it to the cockpit.

CB: The boat lurches and I hit the plinth station just as we all hear a crack, followed by a louder crack. The mast hits the deck at the midship cleat, throwing the butt end of the mast off the step and into the air, though it is still held down by running rigging, wiring and hydraulics leading through the organizer. The port forward window smashes under the mast’s impact on the deck. I see the boom on the cabin house along the port side.

SA: How long until you were in action?

CB: Immediately, I yelled, “rig down, all hands! Grab the rig kit!!” I see Max and Brian ready to come through the port side companionway, and I tell them to make sure their lifejackets and shoes are on and watch for broken glass.

SA: Who’s on the helm at the time?

CB: The pilot was driving on apparent wind when the rig came down, Jon told me it was maybe 5-7 seconds between when the gust hit to when the rig was on the deck. I took the helm from Jon, who'd grabbed the helm and cut out the pilot when the gust hit. Meanwhile, Jon and George opened the aft daybed up to grab the rig ditch kit. Jon grabs a hacksaw to begin cutting the shrouds. The boat still has forward momentum and the swell is causing the rig to move around the deck, and the boom on the pilothouse, so I steer the boat around the mast in the water to try to get the boat pointed dead downwind. The wind has backed down to 40 kts and visibility returned.

SA: What did George and Jon tell you about the moments before the squall hit?

CB: visibility was about 5nm, overcast but there weren’t any dark clouds. Radar was on, XM weather was on, nothing notable in range. George was talking about how well the boat was handling actually.

SA: Talk us through the process of getting the rig off.

CB: We tried to be as calm as we could, but it was all a bit chaotic; I grab my ceramic knife, open the forward sliding windows, and begin cutting all the running rigging and hydraulic hoses. I get hydraulic fluid in my eyes, and George steps in to finish cutting the hoses. I grab a set of wire cutters from the ditch kit and cut all the wiring connecting the mast. Using the ceramic blade, I cut all the halyards where they connect to the deck. George is at the headstay with a hammer, banging the pin out to release the stay from the furler. Jon has just freed the last shroud, and I begin cutting the mainsheet. As soon as the main sheet is cut, the rig is fully disconnected.

SA: And how long do you think all that took?

CB: Somewhere between 5 and 15 minutes.

SA: So everything is free, but all that heavy shit is still laying on the boat. Now what?

CB: We attempt to push the boom off the coachroof, but we can’t move it. There is hydraulic fluid and glass on the deck. We decide the only way to get the rig away from the boat is to drive out from under it. The butt end was cleared, and close to punching the hull with each wave. The starboard engine wouldn’t start, port engine started, and I put it into gear and drove forward, as George guides the boom off the cabin top. We motor away from the rig about two boat lengths, noticing that the storm jib is trailing behind us. I put the engine in neutral and shut it down. Then ask Jon to get comms going with the satphone and handheld, and issue a Mayday.

SA: Okay – damage assessment?

CB: The boom and rig impacted and compressed the pilothouse port mullion above the companionway. This bent the port companionway sliding hatch frame so we can’t shut it all of the way. The port forward window is gone. We were getting rainwater and salt spray in the salon. The electronics and navigation at the helm and radio box are out. The aft enclosure tracks have blown out. Without being underway, we are getting some wave tops into the salon. The port companionway hatch could be an issue if seas get bigger. George checks the port hull bilges for water. There is none. The longeron appears stable. It is lower without the rig but the side and whiskers are supporting it. The electrical tech space with the genset’s charger/inverters has gotten some water through the cleared away mast electrical conduit. Starboard engine still isn’t rolling over. Comms are limited to the Sat phone which is working on its battery. The satphone charger is mounted at the navstation. It’s wet and doesn’t appear to be charging. Port prop is fouled by the storm jib sheets and the seas are too big to get in the water and free them. George, Jon and I have a load of cuts on our hands and knees from the glass, but no major injuries.

SA: How long til Jon made good contact?

CB: Maybe 10 minutes. He had a full emergency contact sheet. Then he initiates the boat’s EPIRB, as well as his personal EPIRB (going to his folks in NYC, who contact GB). Max and Brian are sitting in the settee, quiet and in a bit shock. George is at the helm, trying to get STBD engine going. I go to the port aft scoop and begin fishing the two lines that are stuck around the prop and connected to the storm jib with the boat hook. I pick up the solent halyard and sheet and pull the storm jib up into the salon and begin to cut the sheets as close to the water line as I can. Once it’s clear, I look over at Jon who’s beginning to create a muster station at the helm chair with the liferaft, first aid kit, and both ditch bags. Jon says the Coast Guard is constructing a plan, and that he will make contact with them again in thirty minutes.

SA: Did you know you were going to abandon already?

CB: We weren’t sure at that point, we were still in damage control and assessment stage. I told the crew to get their foulies on and make sure that their lifejackets are ready. George stays at the helm, while Jon and I put on dry clothes and foulies. We compile all other safety equipment at the settee table which was pretty sheltered.

SA: So you’re ready to abandon if you need to – any thoughts of self-rescue at this point?

CB: Of course – no one wants to abandon their boat. I try again to fire up the starboard engine. It finally catches, and I slowly start to bring the boat around so that the swell is on the beam. Heading around 110 degrees, TWS 30kts+ at 220TWD, seas around 15, and we’re making about 4kts.

SA: And meanwhile, the CG isn’t wasting time.

CB: Jon has another transmission with them on schedule, and they tell him that two cargo ships have been diverted for support, and they’d dispatched a helo and C130. The CG was crunching numbers to see if the helicopter could make it to the scene, stay on station long enough and safely back, as we were approaching the end of their range for a helo evac. Shortly after the call, we see a tanker on the horizon. I make contact with the Ocean Crescent over the handheld. They tell us they have no visual, so Jon shoots off three flares, and they confirm our location

SA: Right – the moment of truth. What’s your decision making process when there is a rescuer on site?

CB: I went back to our damage assessment. The port companionway hatch is a concern without being able to close it. If we have to motor into a seaway, the longeron could be an issue and may need to be cutaway, but would be a huge risk trying to get that thing free. Port engine is out with the lines on the prop, and starboard is still having issues. The aft enclosure tracks are blown out. The cockpit and deck have broken glass and hydraulic fluid, the nav station electronics we’re all soaked. Two of the crew were potentially in shock. And the forecast weather coming in was looking pretty horrible.

SA: Some of that could have been sorted out though, right?

CB: Of course, but not easily and not quickly, and if there was one factor that made my decision for me, it was the forecast, combined with our location. A nasty trough was moving in fast with the certainty of continually deteriorating conditions, potential for hurricane-force winds, and huge seas for the next 3 days if we couldn’t motor out of the area. We all discussed it, we all agreed, and radioed the Ocean Crescent.

SA: Was it a relief once you made the decision?

CB: ABSOLUTELY NOT. That fucking sucked. Now we had to get everyone safely onto a ship!

SA: Time for some sketchy action?

CB: Oh yeah. The Ocean Crescent told us to hold course and they would come around our port side, around our transom, and to windward, along the starboard hull. As they were in final approached, they radioed that they would be crossing in front of our bow, then stopping to windward of us. At this time we were going approximately 2-4kts down the waves, no engines (STBD kept cutting out) with our starboard quarter to the wind. The Ocean Crescent made this call while they were within approximately 900ft (3 of their boat lengths) of our bow, approaching at about 10 knots. As they got close, they made an emergency turn to port to try to avoid collision. As soon as it became obvious they were going to hit us, I try a handful of times to get starboard engine on, finally it caught and I threw it into reverse. The starboard side started to turn, exposing our port bow and longeron to the ship, and they collided with our port bow forward of their midships. It was a big blow, and we heard the crunching of the carbon (really getting sick of that sound now), though we didn’t know how much damage we’d sustained as we rolled off their bow wake and slid down their starboard side. But OC was still turning to port, and as we neared their transom, the tanker went bow down on a wave, completely exposing their massive spinning propeller. It missed our port hull by a few feet.

SA: Holy crap!

CB: Yeah, right? Slightly terrifying. Anyway, they radioed back. “Let’s try that again, Captain.” I told them we’d prefer to see if we could get into their lee on our own engine, and slowly bring our starboard side into their port side. They agreed, and we slowly reversed toward them, but were blown away. We made a second attempt after asking them to lower their boarding nets further down the topsides of their boat, and we slowly crept to them, leading with our starboard stern.

SA: Same sea state?

CB: Choppy seas still, maybe 15 feet, with winds still to around 40.

SA: OK. So the second time’s the charm?

CB: Not really! We were able to catch two heaving lines from their crew with Rainmaker standing off about 100 feet from them. It gave us a chance to look at the boats’ relative motions, look at the cargo net, and evaluate the potential transfer. We all agreed that jumping from the cat to the ship would create some real potential for death or serious injury, and we dropped the heaving lines, motoring a couple more lengths to leeward to keep clear of the Crescent.

SA: Scary shit. So then what?

CB: Yeah, not something you can train for. But it looked seriously bad. Anyway, Jon called the CG again and let them know what happened – they responded that the C130 and helo were 20 minutes out, and that the helo would have very little time on station, 18 minutes max. We discussed the options, and agreed unanimously that an air rescue was the best option. Jon radioed back to the Ocean Crescent that we planned a helo evac, and asked them to stay to for support.

Check back tomorrow for the final piece of the Rainmaker saga, including the air rescue, salvage attempts, and lessons learned.

image.jpeg

 

zzrider

Super Anarchist
2,782
3
New England
Yikes. Sounds like after getting bashed by the cargo boat they sure as hell needed to punch out
Agreed. It would also now appear that this particular boat design cannot survive a dismasting and still be a safe platform for its crew: broken glass & hydraulic fluid everywhere, hatches that won't close, wave tops coming into the salon... yikes.

 
So the nice to have "boat show" condo windows are a safety issue to any distance passagemaker? Then the offwatch experience unsinkable, stormproof, Gunboat full tribe member goes from offwatch to Mayday with serious thoughts of getting everyone off the boat in 10 minutes. The boat did not hit a submerged object in the dark at 30 knots. The rig simply fell over in a puff....

The story is interesting how a 55 foot basically new spare no cost boat with three pros aboard and only two passengers can get in very deep trouble in seconds. How long would it take most families to deal with that rig and salt water sloshing into the once seemingly protected spaces. Two adult males are reported to seemingly transition into shock like state?

 
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2,689
0
Im sure the crew made all the right decisons once things went tits up. Hard to plan for a giant rig coming down and busting things up.

But the brochure suggests you can circumnavigate without a crew!

I dont know.. I,m still not sold. Im gonna read the brochure again

The GUNBOAT 55 builds upon the sucess of her earlier sisters, and is the ultimate performance cat for those planning to circumnagivate as owner-operators. The series was designed on the principles of simplicity, reliability and ease of access, and is perfect for those who enjoy sailing and exploring without crew.

Rather than several smaller spaces on the main deck divided by bulkheads, the GUNBOAT 55 has one huge uninterrupted space from the mast to the aft crossbeam. Let’s face it, the moment we step aboard any cat, the aft doors and windows are opened immediately, and usually stay open until we leave the boat. Why not be able to have an open aft end when conditions permit? If the weather turns cold or damp, the aft end seals up snug as a cocoon with a semi-rigid enclosure.

Speed = Storm Avoidance

The ultimate safety feature is pure speed. Sail around storms. If a storm is unavoidable, safety is derived from the ability to surf sideways. With daggerboards up, the round bottom hulls will skate sideways along waves, and the long high bows offer tremendous reserve buoyancy. We believe mega catamarans are the safest platform for surviving the worst weather.

Ultimate Buoyancy

Six water-tight bulkheads, and a carbon reinforced underbody make flooding very unlikely. The composite laminate’s foam core acts as the ultimate reserve buoyancy.

 
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My random peeks and stalking shows PJ has been checking in at least one a day... think he is hoping to score a couple or titty shots or something else?

Peter JohnstoneMember Since 30 Sep 2005
OFFLINE Last Active Today, 09:54 AM

 

kent_island_sailor

Super Anarchist
28,653
6,419
Kent Island!
I was waiting for the part where they deployed the sea anchor and got the boat cleaned up.

BTW - the boat sounds like a family cruiser like a F1 car towing an Airstream is a family car :rolleyes:

 
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us7070

Super Anarchist
10,316
325
i think one thing that could be done before going offshore.., is to fabricate some boards that could stop water from going from the salon down into the hulls - kind of like companionway boards on a monohull.

you would only have to put them in place when you thought they were needed

if you do that.., it's not nearly as big a deal if the windows break - the cabin house becomes like a big hard dodger.., as someone suggested above

 

dopo

Super Anarchist
1,362
0
New York
I am Dumbfounded by part two. Am I the only one that thinks that this Captain Kid sounds like he made some drastic mistakes?

Can someone explain this driving the mast out from under it means?

 
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