Team Vestas grounded
- Thread starter PaulinVictoria
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kent_island_sailor
Super Anarchist
Exacty. Falling off the boat while setting up the spinaker is an inherent risk. Spilling hot coffee on your balls is an inherent risk. Getting run over by the Harbor Queen is an inherent risk. Not paying attention to the charts and hitting all kinds of things is an inherent risk.
Our 420 racers have very little inherent risk because we follow them around in Boston Whalers and make sure they don't kill themselves. This is appropriate because they are children
Our 420 racers have very little inherent risk because we follow them around in Boston Whalers and make sure they don't kill themselves. This is appropriate because they are children
There are always "root" or secondary, tertiary.., whatever.. factors that can contribute to an accident.
On a sailboat, the navigators job is to know what these other factors are, and navigate safely in spite of them - it's part of the job!
this issue with zooming and so on was not unknown even to amateur navigators.
in this particular case, there is enough info on the C-Map charts - actual land indications, depth contours, and right click info - to suggest that detailed study is needed
no body is perfect though and that's how accidents happen
I agree that the software can be made better, but I don't agree that it bears a substantial part of the blame in this situation.
as far as the tactical and WX data obscuring the charts - it can be turned on and off pretty easily - i do it all the time precisely for this reason. there is a single button for WX in expedition, the scheds and optimal routing seem to require 2 clicks to turn on and off - i wish they could be turned off with one click too, and maybe that could be changed - still it's easy to clear the chart of anything that can obscure important info.
I don't see how it's practical to go over possible obstructions in a pre-race navigators meeting - the actual routes are not all that well known at the start, and there are just too many potential obstructions
asking the race organizers to monitor tracking and warn boats is asking for no one to ever organize a race again!
what organizer would want that responsibility/liability?
what else are they supposed to warn the boats about - high wind.., traffic..?
I wish Wouter all the best - I have no doubt that he is a great navigator who just made a mistake, probably because he got too tired. He is not the first sailor to make a mistake, and won't be the last. I certainly hope that he is able to recover from this.
On a sailboat, the navigators job is to know what these other factors are, and navigate safely in spite of them - it's part of the job!
this issue with zooming and so on was not unknown even to amateur navigators.
in this particular case, there is enough info on the C-Map charts - actual land indications, depth contours, and right click info - to suggest that detailed study is needed
no body is perfect though and that's how accidents happen
I agree that the software can be made better, but I don't agree that it bears a substantial part of the blame in this situation.
as far as the tactical and WX data obscuring the charts - it can be turned on and off pretty easily - i do it all the time precisely for this reason. there is a single button for WX in expedition, the scheds and optimal routing seem to require 2 clicks to turn on and off - i wish they could be turned off with one click too, and maybe that could be changed - still it's easy to clear the chart of anything that can obscure important info.
I don't see how it's practical to go over possible obstructions in a pre-race navigators meeting - the actual routes are not all that well known at the start, and there are just too many potential obstructions
asking the race organizers to monitor tracking and warn boats is asking for no one to ever organize a race again!
what organizer would want that responsibility/liability?
what else are they supposed to warn the boats about - high wind.., traffic..?
I wish Wouter all the best - I have no doubt that he is a great navigator who just made a mistake, probably because he got too tired. He is not the first sailor to make a mistake, and won't be the last. I certainly hope that he is able to recover from this.
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frostbit
Anarchist
Disclaimer: I think WAY too much about risk on a day to day basis. Inherent risk is spot on. Then you layer controls to manage those risks. What is left is the residual risk.Exacty. Falling off the boat while setting up the spinaker is an inherent risk. Spilling hot coffee on your balls is an inherent risk. Getting run over by the Harbor Queen is an inherent risk. Not paying attention to the charts and hitting all kinds of things is an inherent risk.
Our 420 racers have very little inherent risk because we follow them around in Boston Whalers and make sure they don't kill themselves. This is appropriate because they are children
So, if we take this example, the risk is hitting an island. Controls are pre-leg expected course review, electronic charts, navigator SOPs, lookouts, etc. All result in mitigating risk and the resultant residual risk should be dramatically reduced.
A wonkier risk discipline view:
Inherent risk of hitting land is very high. Likely to happen multiple times a leg. Disasterous and potentially catastrophic including potential loss of life. If we make a simple 3x3 matrix, and score this, (1 being unlikely, 2 being likely, 3 being very likely and the other axis is 1 being low impact, 2 being medium impact, and 3 being high impact) it falls in the "we better pay attention to these and put some controls in place or we are all going to die" area. In a red/Amber/green scoring matrix, it is clearly red.
Now the controls that mitigate the inherent risk. In this case controls are in place. They don't reduce the impact, but they do decrease the likelihood. Probably to low, or nobody would ever leave the dock. Therefore the residual risk is score of 1 (unlikely) and 3 (high impact). This assumes the controls all work. In this case there were clear control failures. Probably more than one. Definitely the electronic charting has some known, but still difficult to deal with issues. Then there are other failures or controls that need to be improved. Probably in SOPs.
Just another way to consider the problem.
southerncross
Super Anarchist
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I think there are two reasons for understanding what happened on that fateful day on a beautiful little reef in the middle of nowhere.
1) The first reason is a legal one that pertains to an insurance investigation and liability. Human error is at the center of this argument.
2) The second reason is understanding the root cause in a confluence of dynamic events so as to minimize the risk of this ever happening again and minimize the risk of injury or death. This is important. They were lucky this time. Human error, in this argument, is only one contributing factor of many.
1) The first reason is a legal one that pertains to an insurance investigation and liability. Human error is at the center of this argument.
2) The second reason is understanding the root cause in a confluence of dynamic events so as to minimize the risk of this ever happening again and minimize the risk of injury or death. This is important. They were lucky this time. Human error, in this argument, is only one contributing factor of many.
southerncross
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I think there was a question about where to read paper charts on a Volvo 65.
Northshore_Pirate
New member
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You know there was a US Navy Mine Sweeper that ran aground reciently due to the digital charts being off by several miles.
"The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency misplaced a reef in the Philippine Islands by eight miles on its digital nautical charts, which helped cause the USS Guardian to run aground Jan. 17, destroying the ship." quote from the article.
A link to the story is here:
http://www.nextgov.com/defense/2013/08/how-misplaced-reef-digital-chart-destroyed-navy-minesweeper/68126/
Could this be a similar problem?
"The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency misplaced a reef in the Philippine Islands by eight miles on its digital nautical charts, which helped cause the USS Guardian to run aground Jan. 17, destroying the ship." quote from the article.
A link to the story is here:
http://www.nextgov.com/defense/2013/08/how-misplaced-reef-digital-chart-destroyed-navy-minesweeper/68126/
Could this be a similar problem?
smackdaddy
Super Anarchist
jzk
Super Anarchist
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Let me qualify. If the team exercises basic seamanship, sailing into a well charted island on a beautiful night should not be an inherent risk in this race. Other risks are inherent like hitting a submerged object floating just below the surface of the water. A lightning strike. Hitting a whale. That kind of shit.
phillysailor
Super Anarchist
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There are two conversations, broadly speaking, on this thread: root cause analysis, and a discussion of blame and incompetence. (Perhaps three, if one counts fact dissemination and fact checking, but I'm gonna ignore that for the moment.)
Those looking to blame, assign responsibility, and point fingers at the captain and crew aboard Vestas speak an entirely different language and have different goals than those interested in root cause analysis. They are exploring the very human emotions that accompany a disaster and its aftermath are offended and annoyed by those who are strictly trying to learn how the boat ended up on the rocks by examining each system which had impact on the outcome.
So if you want to talk about "mistakes" and "blame" and "responsibility", don't be surprised if you piss off those looking at root cause analysis, and vice-versa. The subsequent confrontation is predictable and entirely understandable. According to the terms of the discussion you are engaged in, it is practically inevitable.
Gypsyclubjuggler
Member
HTFU and stop projecting you pussy. Need therapy indeed...SailBlueH2O said:
^^ Sorry, but those "looking to blame, assign responsibility" are precisely those who ignore "human emotions that accompany a disaster". It's those who understand that mistakes are part of the human condition, and often due to human emotions, who try to understand, not judge, what happened.
Root cause analysis is not restricted to systems. Far from it. Read the thread again, and you will see that group dynamics as well as influence of stress and fatigue are just as much part of the conversation.
That is why the two conversations are inevitably in conflict. Those interested in blaming can't stand that homo sapiens is a complex creature, and those interested in root cause analysis can't stand the blamers who believe that there are fault free procedures to everything.
Don't forget we are talking about a race here. This accident didn't involve any passengers and potential victims of alleged reckless behavior (an occurrence which would understandably inspire rage,anger and finger pointing in its aftermarth). This accident involved a team of professional racers pushing themselves to the limit, and a succession of mistakes, events and omissions lead to a disastrous outcome. (BTW, the same succession could have resulted in a near miss ... if only the winds had been different.)
Looking for scapegoats is everything but a humane reaction in this case. Looking for ways of preventing the succession of mistakes and omissions, an integral part of the human condition, is.
Edit: BTW, nobody is saying that nobody is responsible. What has become clear is that "human error" extends to the crew and team as a whole.
Root cause analysis is not restricted to systems. Far from it. Read the thread again, and you will see that group dynamics as well as influence of stress and fatigue are just as much part of the conversation.
That is why the two conversations are inevitably in conflict. Those interested in blaming can't stand that homo sapiens is a complex creature, and those interested in root cause analysis can't stand the blamers who believe that there are fault free procedures to everything.
Don't forget we are talking about a race here. This accident didn't involve any passengers and potential victims of alleged reckless behavior (an occurrence which would understandably inspire rage,anger and finger pointing in its aftermarth). This accident involved a team of professional racers pushing themselves to the limit, and a succession of mistakes, events and omissions lead to a disastrous outcome. (BTW, the same succession could have resulted in a near miss ... if only the winds had been different.)
Looking for scapegoats is everything but a humane reaction in this case. Looking for ways of preventing the succession of mistakes and omissions, an integral part of the human condition, is.
Edit: BTW, nobody is saying that nobody is responsible. What has become clear is that "human error" extends to the crew and team as a whole.
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southerncross
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As I mentioned above, I think there are two arguments because there are two different conclusions that need to be reached.
One is centered around settling an insurance claim.
The other is about trying to prevent this from happening again.
Both outcomes involve human error. Just more so in the former.
One is centered around settling an insurance claim.
The other is about trying to prevent this from happening again.
Both outcomes involve human error. Just more so in the former.
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My first thoughts exactly! Was about to quote SC then scrolled down....SailBlueH2O said:
They're fooling nobody
joneisberg
Super Anarchist
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No... When overlaid with a Google Earth image, it confirms that the Cargados Carajos are charted quite accurately...
Hmmm, perhaps in addition to the appropriate paper charts, and the relevant light list, the VOR boats might also be required to carry a copy of Jimmy Cornell's WORLD CRUISING ROUTES ?
In which the dangers of the reefs and islands in that part of the Western Indian Ocean are clearly noted :
"...the area is peppered with reefs and small islands, which is a diver's paradise. but used to be a navigator's nightmare until satellite navigation took most of those worries away. Nevertheless, the area should be approached with great caution...
And, from his description of Route IS41, between Mauritius and the Seychelles:
"Boats occasionally break this passage at the Cargados Carajos Reef, which is close enough to the direct route to warrant the detour. The reef belongs to Mauritiius and is visited by fishing boats from that island. Cruising boats are not supposed to stop there without prior permission unless sheltering from bad weather..."
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southerncross
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VOR covering themselves or just Alvimedica? Trust me. I wrote that I suspected the same thing the first time they showed Oakley writing on the charts in the video above.
Maybe it was staged. If the current Leg wasn't soooooo long and... it probably wouldn't have crossed my mind.
^ We need a VOR 2014 Conspiracy Theories thread.
Edit: why would Alvi cover themselves? For NOT crashing in the reef, or to prevent any blame if something happens on the way to AD because they realized they are completely unprepared?
Edit 2: The interesting in that footage isn't the paper chart, it's the fact that guys like Oxley and I suspect Cape are old enough to still take notes by hand ... even on their knees because there is no space at the nav station for a pad of paper.
Edit: why would Alvi cover themselves? For NOT crashing in the reef, or to prevent any blame if something happens on the way to AD because they realized they are completely unprepared?
Edit 2: The interesting in that footage isn't the paper chart, it's the fact that guys like Oxley and I suspect Cape are old enough to still take notes by hand ... even on their knees because there is no space at the nav station for a pad of paper.
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Boo-Yah
Anarchist
This is from one of the early videos. As soon as they(navigator got out of his bunk) zoomed in Team Vestas Wind knew exactly where they were using the electronic tools on the boat. The same with the other VO65 crew who came to their aid by standing by in the lagoon. The electronic charts when fully utilized here seem amazingly accurate. The (4) Officers of the minesweeper were all canned for poor voyage planning. The chart they used was wrong but plenty of sailing notes reflect the well known hazard. The crew or leadership of Vestas Wind are guilty of at least poor voyage planning, failure to maintain situational awareness, and likely the modern equivalent of failure to maintain a proper lookout. The boat combined with its tools knew exactly where it was and where it was headed.... The navy minesweeper report is 160 pages of detail. This stuff is never simple starting with which chart or charts..... In this case the competent mariner should have avoided the hazard with a chart, compass, and sextant.
Yeah very plausible. During some sailing in Oz years ago, I learned shitloads from an old sea dog from Manly who would pull out the charts and explain everything to me. Had only been a racer up till then as a kid. Blind nav, stars.. all that stuff. I learned pretty quickly to stop pointing out to him that we had a GPS/Nav onboard!
^^ Yacht racing in general is considered as hazardous behavior by any "competent mariner" point of view.
Using a navy minesweeper incident as reference for the Vestas grounding is like using a bus accident report as basis to investigate Jules Bianchi's crash in the Japanese GP.
Using a navy minesweeper incident as reference for the Vestas grounding is like using a bus accident report as basis to investigate Jules Bianchi's crash in the Japanese GP.
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